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This paper examines quantity-targeting monetary policy in a two-period
economy with fiat money, endogenously incomplete markets of financial secu-
rities, durable goods and production. Short positions in financial assets and
long-term loans are backed by collateral, the value of which depends on mone-
tary policy. The decision to default is endogenous and depends on the relative
value of the collateral to the loan. We show that Collateral Monetary Equilibria
exist and prove there is also a refinement of the Quantity Theory of Money
that turns out to be compatible with the long-run non-neutrality of money.
Moreover, only three scenarios are compatible with the equilibrium condition:
1) either the economy enters a liquidity trap in the first period; 2) or a credible
ex- pansionary monetary policy accompanies the orderly functioning of markets
at the cost of running an inflationary risk; 3) else the money injected by the
Central Bank increases the leverage of indebted investors, fueling a financial
bubble whose bursting leads to debt-deflation in the next period with a non-zero
probability. This dilemma of monetary policy highlights the default channel
affecting trades and production, and provides a rigorous foundation to Fisher’s
debt deflation theory as being distinct from Keynes’ liquidity trap.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007 and its subsequent adverse effect on GDP deeply chal-
lenges the classical understanding of recessions provided by general equilibrium and
RBC models. Indeed, while no recession preceded the large number of mortgage
defaults, these mortgage defaults and their adverse effect on banks’ capital caused
an economic slowdown and the near financial meltdown. Subsequent pessimism in
the banking sector resulted in a credit crunch. The origin of the view of economic
recessions as being caused by financial instability (rather than being their origin)
can be traced back to 1933, when Irving Fisher advocated his debt-deflation theory
of Great Depressions. He argued that over-indebtedness can precipitate deflation in
future periods and subsequently the liquidation of collateralized debt: debt is denom-
inated in constant nominal terms, whereas the value of the collateral that secures
this debt depends on market forces and monetary aggregates in the economy.
Next, if financial instability can cause economic recession, this raises the question
as to whether the monetary environment may have contributed to excessive lever-
aging and risk-taking in financial markets. The US and global monetary authorities
have been criticized as having been excessively expansionary in the last decade (Tay-
lor, 2009). According to this view, monetary policy in the aftermath of the 2001
recession remained too lax for too long and this triggered asset-price inflation, pri-
marily but not exclusively in the US housing market, and a generalized leverage
boom. Had it followed more closely, say, the Taylor rule, so goes the argument,
the Fed would have tightened rates faster, instead of lowering interest rates further
to counter perceived deflation risks. Accordingly, short-term rates would have been
higher between 2001 and 2005, making the subsequent bursting of the credit bubble
less pronounced.
During the 2007–09 crisis, this latter line of reasoning, however, encountered
the zero-bound problem: while the Taylor rule would have recommended a negative
interest rate, this was not possible to achieve. Fresh thinking was prompted on the
options still available when the interest rate could not be lowered any further (see,
e.g., Eggertson and Woodford (2003)). Drawing lessons from the Japanese experience
from the 1990s, the Fed especially reached the conclusion that monetary policy can
still be effective — which was the origin of the zero-interest-rate policy and other
unconventional policies, such as qualitative and quantitative easing (Meier, 2009).
The purpose of this paper is to examine, within the simplest possible model,
the systemic effects of such unconventional monetary policies within a finite horizon
framework of fully flexible prices in an economy populated by consumers and en-
trepreneurs sharing rational expectations. Within such a framework, the following
questions can be answered: will an expansionary monetary policy necessarily lead to
over-leverage and, eventually, financial instability? Under which conditions does it
fuel inflation in financial assets? Can inflation in commodity markets and in finan-
cial markets be decoupled? When does an expansionary monetary policy lead the
short-term interest rate to the zero lower-bound? Is it possible to recover the two
mystifying phenomena known as Keynes’ liquidity trap and Fisher’s debt-deflation
theory within a general equilibrium model with rational expectations? Are these two
phenomena conceptually distinct?
Money and default
For this purpose, two frictions are introduced in a standard general equilibrium
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model: first, traders face a cash-in-advance constraint for their trades, both in con-
sumption commodities and financial assets. The fact that fiat money is the sole
medium of exchange can easily be explained as an institutional answer to trans-
action costs.1 Since transactions in financial markets are simultaneous to those in
commodity markets, our cash constraint accounts for the financial motives for money
demand underlined by Ragot (2012).2
Second, agents are allowed to (endogenously) default on their long-term loan
obligations as well as on their financial promises.3 Thus, the need for collateral to
back loans and financial assets arises. In all other respects, we maintain the structural
characteristics of general equilibrium analysis, i.e. optimizing behaviour, perfectly
competitive markets and rational expectations.
For simplicity, we consider a two-period economy with finitely many states of
Nature in the second period, finitely many types of households and entrepreneurs, a
Central Bank and no private banking sector.4 The agents we shall consider engage
into long-term borrowing to buy durable goods which they pledge as collateral to
secure their loan. Simultaneously, they can trade collateralized financial assets in
order to redistribute wealth across time and uncertainty. Loans and assets are non-
recourse and there is no utility penalty for defaulting. Whenever the face value of a
security’s promise is higher than the value of the collateral, the seller of the security
can choose to default, and her collateral is seized. Market incompleteness is central
to our analysis, since agents cannot write comprehensive contracts in order to hedge
the possibility of default. Finally, money is the sole medium of exchange and the
quantity of inside money is set by the Central Bank.
Here, we will show under what conditions the monetary policy can drive the econ-
omy to a state which is characterized by defaults on collateralized loan obligations
and/or financial promises, and whose final GDP depends upon such defaults. We do
not engage in a detailed discussion of optimal monetary policy, but rather propose
default as an additional channel through which monetary policy can affect the real
economy.
1.1 The monetary dilemma
We follow Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003a) and the subsequent literature by intro-
ducing fiat money in two potential forms: inside money (which is pure debt issued
by the Central bank) and outside money, which is held free and clear of debt by
economic agents when markets open. In the line of Fisher (1936), outside money can
be interpreted as irredeemable government-issued money, representing equity in the
1See, e.g., Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b).
2It is indeed suggested that a cash-in-advance constraint in the goods market is necessary to
explain why many households hold only small amounts of money, while a cash-in-advance constraint
in financial market explains why a few households hold large quantities of money. This last friction
is thus required to explain why the distribution of money across households is much more similar,
in the US, to the distribution of financial assets than to that of consumption levels—a puzzle for
theories which solely link money demand to consumption.
3This contrasts with, e.g., Kehoe and Levine (1993), where the default penalties constrain bor-
rowing in such a way that there is no equilibrium default.
4We restrict the production sector to entrepreneurs (who are the only owners and managers of
their firms) in order to avoid problems arising from the valuation of a firm in an economy with
incomplete stock markets. For simplicity, the model is stated for two-periods but all our results
apply to any (finite) horizon.
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commonwealth rather than debt.5 We first prove the existence of a collateral mone-
tary equilibrium (Theorem 1) at a general level which, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been done in the existing literature. For this purpose, we slightly modify
the definition of the measure, γ, of gains-to-trade, first introduced by Dubey and
Geanakoplos (2003a), so as to accommodate for default. Furthermore, we make use
of a new hypothesis (HDD) on financial asset deliveries, saying roughly that asset
returns grow at a polynomial speed with respect to macrovariables. All the financial
derivatives we are aware of satisfy this restriction. It serves in proving that, even
when markets become illiquid, asset prices remain bounded. Finally, since default
is allowed at equilibrium, our results hold even when outside money is that without
from the economy.6 Of course, the consequence is that, absent outside money, the
cost of money (i.e., the various interest rates that emerge in the different monetary
markets) solely depends on the ratio between default and inside money. Thus, when-
ever no default occurs in the second period and in the absence of outside money, all
the interest rates are zero.
Money is non-neutral in our set-up, both in the short- and in the long-run. The
quantity of inside money pumped in by the Central Bank influences the volume of
trade and production both in the first period (short-term) and in the second period
(long-term). This is illustrated by means of a thoroughly studied example in Section
2. Beyond the existence and non-neutrality, we prove an analogue of the QTM (cf.
4.1), the consequence of which is that, if the Central Bank injects an unbounded
amount of inside money (i.e., if M → +∞), the level of prices must increase, since
the volume of trade is physically bounded.7 Thus, despite the fact that money is
non-neutral, our QTM enables us to restate partially the traditional wisdom: when
“too much” money is already circulating, adding more money just fuels inflation in
the long-run.
The main result of this paper, however, is a full characterization of equilibria.
The argument driving this characterization (Theorem 2) can be informally stated
as follows. The need to improve the efficiency of trades calls for an increase in the
quantity of money injected into the economy by the Central Bank. Indeed, such an
increase will typically reduce the cost of trading, r, hence provide more incentives
for trade and production. In our two-period set-up, however, as in Dubey and
Geanakoplos (2006a) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006b), the impact of such an
increase of money also depends upon agents’ expectations. If investors believe that
there will not be “enough money” in the next period (relative to the current one), then
the economy enters a global liquidity trap: the short-term interest rate shrinks to
zero (as the stock of money increases), while real cash balances held by households
increase with no effect on the real economy. As economic agents share rational
5As observed by Benes and Kumhof (2012), this is exactly how treasury coinage is currently
treated under U.S. accounting conventions (FASB (2012), Federal Accounting Standards Advisory
Board Handbook, 7, pp. 106-107).
6Loosely speaking, default amounts to creating “outside money” endogenously. Notice, how-
ever, that, even when there is no outside money, our approach does not reduce to the approach
favored by Bloise et al. (2005). There, indeed, the seigniorage of the Central Bank is redistributed
to the households, while here, it is not. By doing so, we remain closer to the modeling option
adopted by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003a,b) and their followers, although we can dispense with
the introduction of outside money.
7Although there is no short sale constraint, trades of financial assets are bounded because of the
scarcity of collateral.
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expectations, and would use money to consume in period 0 if they hold inflationary
expectations about the next period, we could rephrase this phenomenon equivalently
by saying: if the Central Bank cannot commit to sufficiently increasing future stocks
of Bank money so as to increase second period prices, then, anticipating deflation
(or, at least, insufficient inflation on tomorrow’s spot commodity prices), households
will hold more and more money in their portfolios without any inducement from
changing prices in period 0 —which remain fixed even whenever the Central Bank
keeps injecting more money.8
The alternative goes as follows: if, in contrast, households (rationally) expect
the Central Bank to pump in enough money in the second period, so as to increase
prices in the second period, agents go on trading and producing. The impact of a
current increase of monetary liquidity, however, can be twofold. If the leverage ratio
on financial markets is small,9 then a sufficiently large additional quantity of money
will “grease the wheel of commerce” at the cost of running the risk of significantly
raising prices. Indeed, as already noticed, any Quantity Theory equation implies that
an expansionary policy must be driven with care as there exists a threshold above
which it will but fuel inflation in the commodity market. This is the inflationary
scenario. By contrast—and here comes our third scenario—if the Central Bank does
not sufficiently increase the second-period stock of money, and if the leverage ratio in
the market for financial assets is high enough, most of the inside money injected in the
first period will encourage indebtedness and fuel inflation inn assets and collaterals.
A financial bubble can lead to two distinct phenomena in the second period.
Firstly, it may eventually result in debt-deflation in at least one state in the future
(which occurs with positive probability). There, due to the deflationary impact
of the (relatively) restrictive monetary policy, the over-indebted agents are forced
to liquidate their physical asset holdings. This fire sale amplifies the reduction of
prices and further tightens deleveraging constraints. At equilibrium, this vicious
circle results in a complete collapse of trades. Therefore, similarly to Cao (2010) and
Lin et al. (2010), we show that the debt-deflation channel still operates in a closed-
economy with endogenous interest rates, as opposed to exogenous interest rates in
a small open economy as in Mendoza (2010). Moreover, while in Cao (2010), debt-
deflation occurs when a bad shock hits the economy, here, in a position more similar
to Lin et al. (2010), it results from the monetary policy itself. Finally, we show
that, in the state where this debt-deflationary scenario occurs, agents completely
default on their long-run loans. This could be interpreted as a financial crash. The
recent empirical evidence of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) documents the high costs of
boom-bust credit cycles throughout history. Moreover, the recent empirical evidence
of Schularick and Taylor (2012) is supportive of Fisher’s view that high debt levels
are important predictors of major crises. The latter finding is also consistent with
Kumhof and Rancière (2010), who show how very high debt levels, such as those
observed just prior to the Great Depression and the Great Recession, can lead to a
higher probability of financial, and eventually, real crises.
Secondly, the first-period financial bubble may lead to a kind of monstrosity:
debt-inflation. That is, agents succeed in deleveraging without defaulting on their
8Existence of such a robust liquidity trap had been already shown by Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2006b) in a model without default. Here, the liquidity trap is but one out of three possible scenarios
that completely characterize the equilibrium set.
9Equivalently, if margin requirements are high.
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promises. Trades still collapse in the second period but the vicious debt-deflationary
circle of falling prices does not start. On the contrary, the monetary deluge of the
first period can still fuel inflation in the second.
The strength of our characterization is to prove that there is no escape road from
these three stylized narratives: If there is no liquidity trap, and if second-period
monetary policy is not “sufficiently” (which needs to be specified) expansionary with
respect to the first-period injection of money, then there exists at least one second-
period state where agents’ deleveraging leads to no trade. The second result of
our analysis is a sharp distinction between Keynes’ liquidity trap and Fisher’s debt-
deflation theory. A number of economists have challenged Keynes’ concept of a trap
because he actually did not explain how it could come that households hold more
and more money in their portfolios without any inducement from changing prices.
Therefore, one might be tempted to cross Keynes’ contribution with Fisher’s story
and to conclude that the liquidity trap occurs as a consequence of debt-deflation.
Here, we show that, althoughdebt-deflation is not incompatible with the liquidity
trap, the former need not imply the latter as a liquidity trap may occur already in
the first period, before agents possibly engage in any deleveraging process. The third
product of our analysis is to highlight the compatibility of inflation and deleveraging.
In terms of policy, the consequence of our main result is that, if a central bank
wants to facilitate trades by injecting more money and to avoid both a liquidity trap
and a financial crash, it needs to take the risk of inflation. Surprisingly enough,
the argument underlying our Dilemma is quite simple: suppose that the quantity,
Ms, of inside money pumped in by the Central Bank in the second-period state,
s, is bounded, and that effective trades occur in that state. Any Quantity Theory
equation then implies that spot prices in state, s, must be bounded. If this holds
for every second-period state s, then, at equilibrium, both commodity and asset
prices must be bounded as well: otherwise, some agent could sell a tiny part of a
very expensive item in period 0, store the money and buy the whole economy in the
second period. But since the Central Bank, by assumption, pumps in an unbounded
growing stock of first-period money (be it on the short-run or the long-run monetary
market), the boundedness of first-period prices will violate the Quantity Theory of
Money (QTM) unless the short-term interest rate, r0, hits the zero lower-bound. As a
consequence, if no liquidity trap occurs in the first period, then either (unbounded)
inflation will occur or trades will vanish in some second-period state s. Since we
confine ourselves to the (generic) class of economies for which there are positive
gains to trade in every second-period state, the collapse of trades can only occur
because of some brute deleveraging process, the symptom of which is that it must be
accompanied with a complete default in the long-run monetary market. In a sense,
what this paper does is simply to provide a micro-founded framework with rational
expectations where this very simple story can be stated more precisely.
In Section 2, we exhibit a simple example in which all the stylized facts scrutinized
in this paper are at work. In particular, we show that the three scenarios already
alluded to can occur. Regarding the scenario of a financial crash, the example sug-
gests that the higher inflation in financial markets is, the deeper will be the crash in
the bad state of the second period. What makes this phenomenon compatible with
our standard rational expectations framework is the assumption that investors share
heterogeneous beliefs. The 2007–09 crisis highlighted the role of belief heterogeneity
and how financial markets allow investors with different beliefs to gear up leverage.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.64
The monetary dilemma 7
Several investment and commercial banks invested heavily in mortgage-backed secu-
rities, which subsequently suffered large declines in value. At the same time, some
hedge funds took advantage from the securities by short-selling them. One reason
for why little attention has been paid to belief heterogeneity is the celebrated market
selection hypothesis of Friedman (1953): in the long-run, there should be little differ-
ence in beliefs because agents with wrong beliefs should be driven out of the market
by those who share correct beliefs.10 As shown by Cao (2010), however, collateral
requirements prevent market forces from driving out investors with wrong beliefs.
Since we consider collateralized assets and loans, we therefore believe it natural to
consider investors with heterogeneous beliefs.
One by-product of our analysis is that, in the absence of a liquidity trap, what
enables inflation in commodities to remain bounded despite the increase of liquidity,
is the fact that most of the injected liquidity migrates towards financial markets, thus
fuelling financial inflation. The example of Section 2 below presents an economy in
which this happens for a high enough leverage ratio. This provides a theoretical nar-
rative for the Great Moderation of inflation experienced by Western countries for the
last two decades that contrasts sharply with the conventional wisdom. Furthermore,
this example shows that a constant level of domestic prices is compatible with an
increase of the quantity of money injected by the Bank, together with huge inflation
both in the financial markets and the market for collaterals. This happens, e.g., un-
der the condition that the leverage ratio increases at the same speed as the quantity
of money injected in period 0. The reason why collaterals are not immune against
inflation is that they play a dual role: they are used both for their intrinsic value
and as collaterals. The gretaer financial inflation is, the more attractive collaterals
become.
1.2 Implications for monetary policy
Our results raise four kinds of questions:
1) Is the Central Bank condemned to an unbounded increase of money in our
model? No: it can perfectly decide to inject little money in both periods. The “only”
cost of such a prudent policy is that it results in a second-best inefficient allocation
of resources and production plans, whose inefficiency could be partially removed by
the further creation of inside money. By injecting more money, however, the Central
Bank runs the risk of entering into our Dilemma.
2) What happens if the Bank decides in favour of a time-consistent expansionary
policy? Theorem 2 says that two regimes can emerge at equilibrium: either the
Bank’s policy is not credible when it claims it will foster inflation tomorrow, and the
economy enters a liquidity trap, or its policy is credible, markets function “normally”
(enabling agents to exploit more gains-to-trade as the stock of period 0 money in-
creases), but inflation will occur above a certain level of money injection. In our
simplified two-period model, the way agents’ expectations are anchored determines
which regime (deflation versus inflation) will take place at equilibrium. The point,
however, is that both expectations are rational and compatible with the equilibrium
conditions.
3) When does a crash occur? It takes place when, after having engaged on an ex-
pansionary path, the Central Bank does no lend as much money in the second period
10See also Blume and Easley (2006) and Sandroni (2000).
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as it would have been expected to do, given its first-period behaviour. Indeed, most
confident economic actors will have increased their indebtedness in the first period,
so that if there is at least one second-period random state where the Bank’s pol-
icy is not sufficiently expansionary, then Fisherian debt-deflation effect takes place,
and a crash occurs. Again, this is compatible with economic actors having rational
confidence in the Bank’s ability to inject sufficiently money as agents’ expectations
will be confirmed in most second period random states, but not all. The possibility
of borrowing against the asset makes it possible for fewer investors to hold all the
assets in the economy. Hence, the marginal buyer is someone who is more optimistic
than when the leverage rate is lower, raising the price of the asset. This effect was
first identified in Geanakoplos (1997). This connection between leverage and asset
prices is precisely the Leverage Cycle theory discussed in Geanakoplos (2003) and
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008). Actually, a close look at the proof of our Dilemma
(Theorem 2) shows that we do not need this leverage cycle theory for the Dilemma
itself. Rather, we use it in order to construct an example (Section 2) in which a
crash actually takes place.
4) What ingredients are indispensable for the Dilemma to hold? Obviously, we
need heterogeneous agents (at least in terms of wealth and preferences) in order to be
able to speak about debt: a representative agent model cannot present an investor
who owes a debt to nobody. Second, we need to introduce demand for money in
some way or another —and, here, this arises from our cash-in-advance constraint. In
order to be able to conclude that an unbounded expansionary monetary policy leads
to inflation, we also need the analogue of a QTM —and, again, the QTM, here, is
nothing but the sum of individual liquidity constraints. For the crash scenario to
occur, the Dilemma requires, moreover, that equilibrium be compatible with default.
This, in turn, forces us to consider durable goods: if all goods were perishable,
indeed, no contract could be traded since none of them would be backed with any
commodity that is worth something in the second period. Finally, we need markets
to be incomplete in some sense, otherwise even default would never occur as such
at equilibrium: agents would be able to hedge themselves against the possibility
of a credit event. Market incompleteness is also needed for the occurrence of the
liquidity trap when no outside money enters the economy: indeed, when markets are
complete, in the absence of outside money, no liquidity trap can occur in our set-up
(Corollary 5.2) .
Thus, the model we present below seems to be the simplest form under which
our Dilemma can be formulated. The unique ingredient that is superfluous for the
Dilemma itself is the presence of financial assets, subject to some endogenous in-
completeness due to the collateral constraints. We could also introduce exogenous
market incompleteness or, even, shut out the financial sector. Thus, the reader of
this paper could think of the financial asset market as being closed. Only in the
illustrative example of Section 2 do we use financial assets (collateralized by some
durable capital) to exhibit a crash scenario. To be more precise, Theorem 2 works
under two environments: either there is some positive outside money or the long-run
monetary market is open. Out of these two environments, the monetary Dilemma
fails for obvious reasons. Indeed, absent of outside money and whenever the long-
run market is closed, a collateral monetary equilibrium reduces to a barter collateral
equilibrium, as defined, e.g., by Geanakoplos and Zame (2010). If, in addition, the
financial asset market is closed, even the possibility of default disappears from the
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model.
5) One last ingredient at play in this paper is the assumption that investors’
attitudes towards uncertainty are heterogeneous—either because they share different
beliefs about uncertain second-period states or because they exhibit diverse risk-
aversions. This assumption is not needed for our Dilemma. However, we use it in
the example of Section 2, and it is helpful to explain how the crash scenario can
occur. The role of heterogeneity in explaining how the burst of a financial inflation
leads to fire sales has long been acknowledged by Geanakoplos (2001). In “bullish”
times, optimistic investors are those who are ready to purchase risky assets at the
highest price, and for this purpose, who are more likely to borrow money. Pessimists
(or more risk-adverse investors), in contrast, are found rather among lenders. When
bad news occur, it is the shift of wealth between optimistic investors and pessimistic
ones that can create a dramatic fall in prices and, eventually, a crash.
Before drawing the links between our approach and the literature, let us mention
which remedy could be applied to this dilemma related with current Central Banks’
non-conventional policies. We do not offer any magic alternative solution. However,
our model points in the following direction. In order to avoid the threat of the
liquidity trap, the Bank should convince economic actors that it will not tighten its
monetary policy in the future. Long-term interest rates emerge as a good instrument
for this purpose (see the discussion at the end of Section 2). However, quantitative
easing in the sense of outright asset purchasing can turn out to be ineffective in
order to fight against the liquidity trap. A unconventional policy designed to affect
the yield curve over longer-than-usual horizons therefore seems unavoidable. On the
other hand, in order to eliminate financial exuberance, regulatory authorities should
reduce the leverage power of financial derivatives. What would be the upshot of such
a policy mix? Since the reduction of leverage in financial markets will make them
less attractive, the quantity theory of money implies that it can only induce domestic
inflation in consumption goods. Therefore, deliberately fostered inflation eventually
emerges as a pis aller in order to avoid both deflation and financial crashes.
1.3 Related literature
Our work relates to the strand in the literature which argues that financial crises
and in particular defaults on financial contracts can lead to economic recessions.
Bernanke (1983) established that the Great Depression can be better explained when
one explicitly models banking behaviour and introduces the concept of the balance
sheet channel in the conduct of monetary policy. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) mod-
elled, within a partial-equilibrium OLG framework, a collateral-driven credit con-
straint, introducing strong information asymmetries, whereby a firm is only able to
obtain fully collateralized loans. Hence, the value of the firm’s assets has to be greater
than the value of the loan or, at the limit, equal to it. Due to the scarcity of assets
and capital, the amount of credit accorded to the firm shrinks in the presence of
deflationary pressures on the prices of its assets. This introduces an external finance
premium, which grows with a decrease in the relative price of capital. In turn, an
increase in the cost of capital will result in a decrease in the marginal product and a
reduction in GDP.Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show that GDP and investment not
only depend on economic fundamentals and productivity, but also on the soundness
of firms’ financial situations, which is an important source of financial instability.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.64
10 G. Giraud and A. Pottier
We argue in this paper that, if information asymmetries are certainly a crucial el-
ement in the financial situation of economic agents resulting in recessions, they are
not alone. Instead, the possibility of positive default and asset liquidation weaken
the stability of the financial system and may result into unexploited gains-to-trade
or a lower GDP. Indeed, belief (or information) asymmetry arises in our Theorem 2
only for the occurrence of the third scenario, and could be replaced by asymmetries
in risk-aversion. In any case, Theorem 2 shows that a liquidity trap may occur in
the absence of any kind of household or entrepreneurial heterogeneity.
But the emergence of our third, “crash” scenario shows that a Fisherian approach
to debt can be recast within our perfectly competitive framework, as a decrease in the
second-period money supply (relatively to the first-period money supply) can lead
to over-indebtedness, higher default and ultimately a crash in the financial sector.
To our knowledge, the analytical framework supporting Fisher’s theory has not yet
been developed in the literature at the level of generality considered in this paper.
The seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), which assumes fully collateralized
loans, and Mendoza (2006), who introduces collateral constraints in an RBC model,
have paved the way in this direction. Nevertheless, they neither explicitly model
money nor do they allow for positive default in equilibrium. Bernanke et al. (1999)
consider a monetary economy along the lines of Dynamic New Keynesian models.
However, they focus on real contracts and argue that the modelling of nominal ones
is an important step for future research. This prevents their approach from shedding
light on the observation that recessions follow financial crises. In the present work,
nominal long-term loans play a crucial role, since their face value is invariant to
deflationary pressures, while the value of collateral that backs them is not.
Relying on a standard New Keynesian framework, Eggertson and Krugman (2010)
also aim at providing firm theoretical grounds to the debt-deflation story. They
indeed prove the existence of a liquidity trap induced by the deleveraging effect of
an adverse shock on the debt-limit faced by borrowers. However, they deal with a
cashless economy, in which the Central Bank sets a nominal interest rate according
to a Taylor rule, and where some firms face sticky prices. In contrast, we make
the monetary transactions entirely explicit within a fully flexible price framework in
which the Central Bank may follow any arbitrary monetary policy. Above all, the
authors introduce an exogenous debt limit faced by each consumer, set in real terms,
and whose origin remains unmodelled. In a sense, the present paper provides an
answer in terms of monetary policy: the exogenous shock to the debt limit introduced
by Eggertson and Krugman (2010) is replaced, here, by a contractionary monetary
policy (or, more precisely, a policy that is rationally expected by investors not to be
sufficiently expansionary).
Our approach is related to the work on the debt deflation theory of Sudden Stops
(Mendoza, 2006, 2010; Mendoza and Smith, 2006). They introduce collateral con-
straints in an RBC model of a Small Open Economy to show that when debt is
sufficiently high, an adverse productivity shock triggers the constraints and results
in a fire-sale spiral, falling prices and a reduction in output. Our results point to
the same direction, though contrary to them we consider a monetary economy with
nominal contracts and focus on monetary shocks, which have not been studied in the
literature as much. In addition, they do not allow for the possibility of default. The
latter is crucial to our analysis, since it is the reason that capital gets reallocated
leading to inefficient production. Due to fully flexible nominal prices, indeed, mon-
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etary policy only affects the price level in the final period and not the total output
in the absence of default.
The closest work to ours is the paper by Lin et al. (2010). In this, an en-
trepreneurial economy with two agent-firms is considered. One output commodity is
produced by a single storable capital good. Inside money is introduced but neither
are outside money, nor financial assets. Our paper can be viewed as the extension
of Lin et al. (2010) to a multiple-commodity world, populated by an arbitrary finite
number of households and/or entrepreneurs, some of them being possibly equipped
with outside money, and in which financial markets are open in the first period.
These additional features have several important consequences: as a result of the
absence of outside money, Lin et al. (2010) cannot avoid the somewhat paradoxi-
cal property that, without default, interest rates are all zero, without there being
any liquidity trap. Moreover, they essentially consider the second-period impact of
a contractionary monetary policy taking place in the first period. Consequently,
they cannot present the existence and robustness of a liquidity trap. In contrast,
here, equilibrium interest rates are non-zero even in the absence of default, unless a
liquidity trap has been reached.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an example in which
the three scenarios of our Dilemma exist. Section 3 develops the general model.
In Section 4, we provide some general properties of Collateral Monetary Equilibria,
such as an endogenously determined quantity theory of money and non-arbitrage
relations within the yield curve. Section 5 is devoted to proving the alternatives
faced by monetary authorities: either they refrain from injecting money into the
economy, at the cost of leaving an inefficient Collateral Monetary Equilibrium take
place; or they pump in a virtually infinite quantity of money but then, in order to
escape from a liquidity trap, they must convince economic actors that they will still
inject a lot of money in the future. If they succeed in this unconventional task, then
they face two alternative risks: either huge domestic inflation (when the leverage
ratio on financial markets is low) or a financial exuberance (when the leverage ratio
is high) whose bubble bursting may induce a general collapse of the economy in at
least one second-period state of nature. A concluding section discusses the results of
the paper in light of the 2007-09 crisis. Technical proofs are placed in the Appendix,
in which the double auction underlying our model is made explicit.
2 An example
The next example exhibits a situation where the three scenarios alluded to in the
Introduction can occur. In particular, a global crash occurs with positive probability
provided the leverage ratio is sufficiently large on financial markets.11
2.1 Some preparation
Let us briefly recall the basic properties of a one-shot Arrow-Debreu economy (with
no uncertainty and no financial markets) where a cash-in-advance constraint, outside
11It can be seen as a monetary version of example 8 in Geanakoplos and Zame (2002).
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and inside money are introduced. The reader familiar with this literature can skip
this subsection.
The cash-in-advance constraint looks like: p · z+h ≤ mh, where p is the vector
of prices of items available for trade, zh is the vector of net trades of investor h,
z`+h := (max{z`h, 0}) its positive part (i.e., the net purchases of h) and mh the cash
balance available to h when entering the market. At equilibrium, this inequality
will be binding, so that, summing over h yields the following version of the quantity








The difference with Fisher’s celebrated equation is that, here, money velocity is





endogenous, and depend upon the aggregate quantity of circulating money,
∑
hmh.
The consequence of this endogeneity is that equation (1) is compatible with the non-
neutrality of money. To be more precise, in a one-shot economy, a part, µh ≤ mh,
of the cash balance is borrowed by h on the monetary market, and needs to be
repaid, at the end of the day, at the cost of an interest rate, r. This cost induces a
disincentive to trade unless the gains-to-trade are sufficiently large. In Dubey and
Geanakoplos (2003a), it is proven that γ > r is a sufficient condition for the existence
of a monetary equilibrium with money having a positive value—where γ is a measure
of the potential gains-to-trade at the initial allocation of endowments.12 Another
way to understand the interaction between the monetary and the real spheres of the
economy is to realize that (1), together with the standard budget constraint, implies
the following non-linear budget constraint:
p · z+h −
1
1 + r
p · z−h ≤ mh (2)
wheremh := mh−µh is the outside money hold by h, and z−h := z+h −zh is the vector of
net sales of agent h.13 Outside money can be interpreted in various alternative ways,
such as: 1) fiscal injection ; 2) money free and clear of debt, arising from previous
defaults that occurred in some non-modelled past14. Equation (2) highlights the role
of the interest rate, r, in the wedge between ask prices, p, and bid prices, p/(1 + r).
The gains-to-trade condition, γ > r, can then be interpreted as meaning: potential
gains-to-trade need to be sufficiently high with respect to the bid-ask spread for
trades to be effective at equilibrium, and for money to have a positive value.
The link between monetary policy and equilibria rests on the distinction between
outside money and inside money: mh = mh + µh. Since money is fiat, no agent has
12To be extended to our context in section 4.1 below.
13This formula will be extended below to our two-period set-up with collateralized assets and
loans, see Proposition 4.3).
14We shall see in section 4 that, at the end of the last period of trades, all the outside money flows
back to the Central Bank. Provided the Central Bank is linked with the government’s Treasury,
the interpretation of mh as fiscal injection is compatible with the spirit of a non-Ricardian fiscal
policy where public debt always vanishes at equilibrium, provided no default occurs on the long-run
monetary market, but may not do so out of equilibrium or a soon as some default appears on the
long loans of the Central Bank. Section 5 will prove that, once assets are collateralized, defaults
occur, at equilibrium, in a number of circumstances. This yields some relevance to the second
interpretation of outside money, in terms of money inherited from past defaults.
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any interest in keeping money at the end of the day, so that all the outside money






As a consequence, denoting by M =
∑
h µh the quantity of (inside) money injected
by the Central Bank, one has, at equilibrium: r =
∑
hmh/M . Thus, monetary policy
—be it targeted towards the quantity of money, M , or towards the interest rate, r—
will have an influence on the cost of trading. Since this cost must be balanced with
respect to potential gains-to-trade for an equilibrium to emerge, monetary policy
will, in general, influence not only the level of prices but also the volume of trades.
Hence, money is non-neutral.
2.2 The monetary economy
There are two time periods (t = 0, 1), two states g (good) and b (bad) in the second
period, two goods, F (food) and S (stock), and two agents P (the pessimist) and
O (the optimist). Only the stock can serve as collateral. Food is perishable and
stock is durable: food in period 0 must be consumed in that very period and cannot
be inventoried, while stock can be consumed in period 0, stored into period 1 and
consumed in this last period. Each agent has a specific storage (or production)
function saying how much of a commodity she can store from period 0 to period 1.
For simplicity, the storage functions are linear (constant returns to scale) gPs (F, S) :=
(0, S) and g0s(F, S) = (0, 2S), every F, S, s. In words, if the optimist stores one unit
of stock, she gets two units of stock at the beginning of the second period: her
productivity is twice that of the pessimist. Expected utility functions are:
uP
(









uO(F0, S0; (Fg, Sg), (Fb, Sb)
)
:= F0 + .9(Fg + 10Sg) + .1(Fb + 6Sb).
Every agent is risk-neutral; optimists assess the good state as more likely and have



























The Pessimist is wealthy and owns 4 units of stock in period 0. No creation of stock
takes place in period 1, so that all the stock available in that period must arise from
some stock that has been stored in period 0. The quantity of outside money owned
by h in state s is mhs . Monetary endowments are:








mO = (2; 1, 1).
Agent O has the same monetary endowment in both second period states.
The Central Bank injects inside money Ms on the short-term loan market s.
That is, the Bank precommits to the size of its borrowing or lending, letting interest
rates be determined endogenously at equilibrium.15 For the time being, monetary
15At the other extreme, we may suppose that the bank has interest rate targets, and precommits
to supplying whatever money or bonds are demanded at those rates. In a one-shot economy both
policies are equivalent (Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2003a), but already in a two-period economy with
exogenous market incompleteness, they are not (Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2006a). Moreover, we are
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authorities do not intervene on the long-run market. A single asset can be traded in
period 0, Aβ, whose price is piβ, which promises delivery of β times the price of one
unit of food in each state, collateralized by a unit of stock (hence, the collateral level
of asset Aβ is exogenous). The actual delivery of one unit of asset in state s ∈ S is
Asβ := min{βpsF ; psS}.




2.3 Some preliminary remarks
1) Whatever being the quantity target of the Central Bank, rs ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ {0, b, g},
and r0 ≥ r0. Indeed, if rs < 0 in state s, the households could infinitely arbitrage
the Bank. The same holds if r0 < r0 in the interest-rate target model: Investors
could just finance any short-term loan by borrowing the corresponding cash on the
long-run market. If, r0 < r0 in the quantity target model withM0 > 0, then, nobody
would borrow on the short-term loan market, which would therefore not clear.
2) When rs > 0 ∀s, agents spend all the money at hand on purchases: Indeed,
they can deposit money they do not intend to spend (or else borrow less), receiving
the money back with interest, before they face the next buying opportunity.17
3) The optimist (i.e., the borrower or asset-seller) will always find it advantageous
to buy stock entirely on margin because the cost of selling the asset in order to
purchase the stock will never exceed the cost of the stock itself at time 1: Either the
stock’ price is higher than the return of the sold asset and the borrower earns the
difference; or the stock’s price is lower than the promised return, and the borrower’s
stock is seized and the borrower incurs no loss. Hence, at equilibrium, the number
of units of security bought by agent P (i.e., the lender or, equivalently, the security-
buyer) is equal to the number of units of stocks she sells.
4) In the good state, since agents have identical (linear) preferences, there is no
trade as soon as rg > 0. If, on the other hand, rg = 0, then the equilibrium is
indeterminate. For simplicity, we assume that rg = 0. If either the Stock or the
Food is actively traded in state g, both must be traded, so the equilibrium is interior
and the relative price of the two goods will be pgS/pgF = 10. Indeed, suppose that
agent h buys some shares and sells some food in state g. Then, denoting ∇hx := ∂u
h(·)
∂x








mainly interested in this paper in unconventional policies whose need arises from the zero-bound
problem. We therefore confine ourselves to quantity target policies.
16Recall that an investor who borrows D and invests A = K+D in an asset faces a leverage ratio
` := D/K. Hence, our definition of the leverage. Equivalently, one could measure the “leverage”
on loan markets through the margin requirement. In practice, margin requirements (which, in the
US, are set by the Federal Reserve) are usually expressed in terms of a cash down payment as a




17This is Lemma 2 in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006a).
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otherwise h would do better by reducing (by a little) both her purchase of Stock and
her sale of Food. But since there are only two households, the reverse inequality
must hold for h’s partner. Next, if the equilibrium is interior (i.e., no consumption
lies on a boundary), (3) holds as an equality.
5) For every agent h and every state s, let us denote by µhs the marginal utility




` = 1, ..., L.
Note that µhS is independent of which ` is used in its definition. Similarly, the












Again, µh0 is independent from the commodity ` that served in defining it. Finally,






It follows from Geanakoplos and Zame (2009) that the price piβ of the asset Aβ
must weakly exceed its fundamental value. On the other hand, the pessimist is
risk-neutral and indifferent about the timing of food consumption, so that the price,
piβ, of the asset Aβ cannot strictly exceed the pessimist’s expectation of its delivery.














6) The relative value of collateral (stock) with respect to food in the good state
being always 10 (cf. 4) above), the optimist will not default in the good state as long
as β ≤ 10. In the bad state, she defaults only if β > pbS/pbF = 3. Thus, whenever
3 < β ≤ 10, the relative price of Aβ with respect to p0F is 12(β + pbSpbF ): in the good
state, Aβ delivers β units of Food ; in the bad state, 1 unit of stock (whose marginal
utility is given by its price relative to Food):
piβ =














) if β > 10.
18As in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008).
19Here, ∇PsF denotes the marginal utility of P with respect to Food in state s.
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2.4 The monetary dilemma
Case 1: low leverage








1, 1, 8; 1, 10; 1, 6
)






















r0 = 7/89 ∼ 0.08, rg = 0 and rb = 12 .
Let us explain why. The asset price is piβ = 1 and there is no default in period 1.
At date 0, it is in the optimist’s interest to sell as much food as possible in order to
buy as much stock as possible. Hence, the optimist sells all her food and borrows to
buy stock on the margin. But she cannot afford to buy all the stock; the pessimist





(piβαOβ + p0F q
O






(θ + 24) = 2,
that is, she buys θ units of stock and sells 24 units of food and θ units of asset. The












Thus, the number of shares bought by the optimist in period 0 is θ = 26+2r0
7+8r0
=
24/7 < 4. At the beginning of period 0, the optimist borrows 8θ − 2 ∼ 25.42 on the
short-loan market, and at the end, she spends her whole initial endowment in outside
money in paying the interest of her loan, r0(8θ − 2) = 2. Therefore, the optimist
does not save money from period 0 to period 1. The same holds for the pessimist.
The aggregate quantity, M0 = 356/7 is entirely borrowed by the two agents, and the
payment of the interests, r0M0 = 4, exhausts the aggregate outside money initially
present at date 0.
In the bad state, the optimist spends θpbF = θ to repay her risky loan on the
asset market, gets an output of 2θ shares of stock out of the θ shares that had been
held as collateral, spends pbS(4− θ) to purchase the remaining 4− θ shares of stock,
and sells part of her initial endowment in food in order to finance her purchases. But
her budget constraint is:
θ + 6(4− θ)− 1
1 + rb
qObF = 1
which yields qObF =
123
14
= eObF . Thus, having sold her entire endowment in food, the
optimist has no additional income.
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At the date 0 price vector of (1, 8), the pessimist is exactly indifferent between





θ + 6(4− θ)) = eObF − 2θ1 + rb = 9021 = mPb
which confirms that the macrovariables listed above form indeed a cme.
Case 2: High leverage.
Now, take 3 < β ≤ 10.20 We shall see that the unique equilibrium becomes:



















β) = 2. (5)
The budget constraint of the pessimist is
4piβ + 24p0F − 4p0S
1 + r0
= 2, (6)




) (recall 11) supra) and r0 = 4M0 .
















(β + 2)(1 + r0)
2r0(β + 14)
(10)
In the bad state, the optimist gets 8 units of stock out of the 4 hold as collateral,
but she defaults on her financial promise, so that 4 units of stock are seized by the
pessimist. Notice that, this time, the aggregate production of stock in the bad state
is 8 while it was only 52/7 < 8 in case 1. The monetary policy therefore has an
impact not only on the final distribution of wealth but also on the GDP level. To
put it more dramatically, the high leverage enables optimists (who, here, coincide
with more productive agents) to borrow more money, hence to invest more and,
finally, to produce more. This positive effect, however, is balanced by the fact that
these more leveraged agents may encounter an adverse shock (here, the bad state)
which forces a brute deleveraging process resulting into default and no-trade. The
Japanese experience of the 1990s might be interpreted in the light of this very stylized
example.
20Whenever β > 10, the (optimist) borrower will default in both states of period 1. Hence, Aβ is
identical to its collateral. The economy reduces to the situation where no asset can be traded.
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What happens, now, if the monetary policy becomes deliberately more expan-
sionary? The leverage ratio is given by
` =
piβ
(1 + r0)p0S − piβ =
β + 2
12 + r0(14 + β)
.
For a fixed β, the impact of increasing the quantity of money, M0, is transparent:
as M0 grows to infinity, r0 shrinks to 0, ` → (β + 2)/12, and both p0F , p0S and
piβ → +∞. However, for this to be compatible with the equilibrium conditions, the
quantity of money injected in period 1 must increase as well, at least in the good
state. Indeed, suppose thatM0 → +∞ butMg remains fixed. This means that prices
in the good state will remain constant, say, equal to pg = (1, 10). But then, for M0
high enough, the sale of a quantity, ε > 0, of food in period 0 will enable each agent
to save enough money into period 1 to be able to buy the whole aggregate endowment
of commodities in the good state. This contradicts the equilibrium condition. Thus,
either Mg increases proportionately to M0, so that prices in the good state also
increase to infinity, or the economy falls into a liquidity trap in period 0. In the
latter case, there is a threshold, M0, such that, for every M0 ≥ M0, the short-term
interest rate hits its floor, r0 = 0, and the additional money, M0 −M0, is hoard by
the agents at time 0, but remains unused (and flows back to the Central Bank at the
end of period 0 at no cost).
Next, for a fixed M0 (or, equivalently, a fixed r0), if β increases, then the price of
the asset, piβ increases together with `, and p0S remains constant while p0F decreases.
Thus, increasing the leverage ratio while keeping the quantity of circulating money
constant induces a deflation on the domestic sector. This phenomenon could be
called a “migration of liquidity towards the financial market”, due to its increasing
attractiveness.
Finally, if, say, β = 1/r0, then piβ and p0S still increase as β grows, but p0F
remains bounded. This suggests that, whenever the leverage ratio increases at a speed
similar to that of the quantity of circulating money, then, this additional money fuels
inflation on the financial market, but leaves domestic prices untouched (the price of
food in period 0 is constant), while only the price of the collateral increases (as did
the housing market prices between 2001 and 2006). This means that the deflationary
effect due to the migration of liquidity towards financial markets can be compensated





it is increasing in β = M0/4. This might provide an explanatory scenario for the
sequence of prices observed during 2001 and 2007.
2.5 Quantitative easing
In order to escape from the crux highlighted by the previous example (inflation/liquidity
trap/crash), the Central Bank may engage in quantitative easing (as the Banks of
England and Japan, and the Federal Reserve did after 2009). Recast in our set-up,
such an unconventional policy consists in: either targeting the long-term interest
rate, r0, or lending extra money by buying the asset Aβ in period 0.
Let us begin with the first unconventional monetary policy.
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Manipulating r0 clearly has an effect in our model, as soon as the long-term
markets are active at equilibrium. This means that the usual explanation for the
restriction of conventional policies to the short end of the yield curve—namely, that
the determination of longer-term interest rates can be left to market mechanisms
through no-arbitrage arguments—does not hold in our setting: equilibrium condi-
tions do not enable, in general, to deduce r0 from r0, (rs)s. As we shall see, more
generally, in section 4, this is due to the collateral constraints, which break down the
traditional non-arbitrage relationships within the yield curve. Thus, there is room
for a policy that affects the yield curve at longer-than-usual horizons. No-arbitrage,




1 + r0 − 1
1 + rs
So that an increase of M0 must imply, in general, an increase of Ms in at least one
state.22 Thus, this first version of quantitative easing may succeed in circumventing
the liquidity trap but at the cost of forcing the Central Bank to commit to an
expansionary monetary policy in at least one future state.
Let us turn to the second interpretation of quantitative easing. To keep the
analysis simple, suppose that the Central Bank does not offer money on the long-
term market but rather offers to buy the asset Aβ against fresh money.
Clearly, when β > 2, this would have no effect on the equilibrium: the optimist
already borrows to the pessimist the needed amount of money in order to purchase
the 4 units of stock available in period 0. Hence, the optimist holds already the
maximal amount of collateral and there is no additional collateral to secure any
additional loan.
When β ≤ 2, the picture is more interesting. Absent such a quantitative easing
policy, as we have already seen, the optimist cannot borrow enough from the sole
pessimist to buy all the stock at time 0. Suppose, therefore, that the Central Bank
buys Aβ in place of the pessimist (who saves her money for a better use). If the
quantity of fresh money thus injected is large enough, the optimist will now be able
to buy all 4 shares of stock on margin at date 0. The budget identity of the optimist
in period 0 is:
4p0S − 1
1 + r0
(24p0F + 4βpbF ) = m
2
0,



















Thus, quantitative easing (in its second version) does have a real effect on the econ-
omy. Its weakness, of course, is that such a non-conventional policy is limited by
21See Proposition (4.2) (iii) infra.
22In the previous example, this would mean in the bad state, as the good one is irrelevant.
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the quantity of collateral already available in the economy. The Central Bank might
therefore wish to supplement it with a more conventional policy consisting in reduc-
ing r0 at the same time. Equation (11) shows that p0F will then explode to infinity
again. As already seen above, in order to circumvent the liquidity trap, such a mixed
monetary policy needs to be accompanied by a commitment of the Central Bank to
decrease rs in each state of the world of period 1. In other words, at least within this
example, the two understandings of quantitative easing given here do not suffice in
circumventing the monetary dilemma.23
3 The model
We consider a two-period monetary economy with heterogeneous agents, several
consumption goods, money, capital markets and collateral constraints.
3.1 The physical economy
The set of states of nature is S∗ := {0, 1, ..., S}. State 0 occurs in period 0, then
Nature moves and selects one of the states in S := {1, ..., S}, which occurs in period
1. The set of commodities is L := {1, ..., L}. Therefore, the commodity space24 is
RS∗×L+ , where the pair s` denotes commodity ` in state s.
The set of consumer types is H := {1, ..., H}.25 Each type h is endowed with
eh ∈ RS∗×L+ , and has a utility function: uh : RS
∗×L
+ → R. There is no loss of
generality in assuming that, in each state, no agent has the null endowment and that
every marketed good is actually present in the economy, i.e., ehs := (ehs1, ..., ehsL) >
0 ∀h ∈ H, s ∈ S∗, and ∑h∈H ehs >> 0 ∀s ∈ S∗. Each utility function, uh(·),
is continuous, quasi-concave, strictly increasing, and verifies the local non-satiation
property: for each xh ∈ RS∗×L+ and each ε > 0, there exists some yh in the open ball,
B(xh, ε), of radius ε and centred at xh, such that uh(yh) > uh(xh). No uh(·) need to
be separable.
If a bundle x ∈ RL+ is consumed (used) at time 0 by agent h, ghs (x) ∈ RL+ is what
remains in state s at date 1. For each state s and every h, the storage mapping (it
can be equivalently thought as a production function) x 7→ ghs (x) is assumed to be
linear throughout this paper26. Since utilities need not be monotone, certain durable
assets can be interpreted as capital and the function ghs (·) as a random production
technology faced by individual entrepreneurs.27 Commodity ` is perishable for agent
h at date 0 if ghs (δ0`) = 0 ∀s, and durable otherwise. Gold, residential mortgages,
23See McMahon and Polemarchakis (2011) for another work on quantitative easing in a GEI
model, where, within a Ricardian framework (i.e., no outside money and full redistribution of the
Bank’s seigniorage), Quantitative Easing leads to the indeterminacy of prices.
24Throughout this paper, for a vector x of a real vector space Rn, we denote x > 0 if x has non-
negative components and at least one positive, and x >> 0 if all its components are positive (we
then write x ∈ Rn++). δ` is the vector (0, ...0, 1, 0, ...0) of Rn+ where 1 stands in the `th coordinate.
25Each type of agent is thought of as represented by an interval, [0, 1], of identical clones, with
the Lebesgue measure. Hence, each agent takes macrovariables (prices and interest rates) as given.
Throughout the paper, we focus on type-symmetric equilibria.
26We make this assumption because collateral for assets enter the storage function. If we had
excluded collateral from the storage function, or used a specific linear storage function for collateral,
we could have used a general concave storage function.
27Lin et al. (2010) provide a particular instance of this interpretation.
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time purchases of cars and other consumer durables provide natural examples of such
commodities.28
3.2 Money
Money is fiat but is the sole medium of exchange. Hence, all purchases are out
of cash (this is the so-called cash-in-advance constraint (Clower, 1967)). Money
potentially enters the economy in two ways. Each agent h has endowments of money





the aggregate quantity of outside money available in state s. Observe that we do
not impose ms > 0 in any state s. When positive, this monetary endowment can be
interpreted as transfer payments from the Treasury government that are independent
of equilibrium prices or, alternatively, as residual cash inherited from some default
that occurred in the unmodelled past.29 Following Woodford (2003) and Dubey and
Geanakoplos (2003a,b), this is called outside money.
A Central Bank stands ready to make intra-period loans totaling Ms > 0 in
each state s ∈ S∗ and also to make the long loans totaling M0 > 0 for two period
starting at date 0. Money is perfectly durable. If the interest rate on loan n ∈ N :=
{0, 0, 1, ..., S} is rn, then anyone can borrow µn/(1 + rn) by promising to repay µn
at the time the loan comes due.
In the initial period, agents finance their trading (or their investment in the
capital good) both through short-term and collateralized long-term borrowing. For
simplicity, we assume that there is no default on the short-term loans market.30 When
agent h borrows from the collateralized long-term loan market, she pledges the goods
purchased as collateral.31 Only durable goods are eligible as collateral. In the first
period, the borrower pays interest on her long-run loans; she can never default on
these, and this is consistent with no-default on the short-term loans market.32 In the
second period, the borrower either delivers in full the amount of the collateralized
loan or defaults. In case of default, the collateral pledged is foreclosed and is put for
sale in the secondary market. The receipts are transferred to the Central Bank and
determine the effective return on the collateralized loan. Between the two periods,
28Storable commodities that are not durable (such as tobacco, wine,...) are those goods that can
be stored (i.e., ghs (x) 6= 0 in at least one state s) only if they are not consumed in period 0. In order
to focus on the essential, we neglect such goods.
29Thus, in the parlance of Woodford (1994), when ms > 0 for some state s, we are considering
non-Ricardian monetary policies. Since our purpose is not to study the optimal public policy, we
take these transfers as exogenously given. As we shall see, equilibria exist whatever being the size
of these transfers —even when they are zero.
30This is in conformity with current observation. On the Repo market, for instance, there is
virtually no default, and even in crisis periods (such as 1994, 1998 or 2007–10), the rate of default
remained hardly significant.
31Collateralized long-term loan extension is not an unusual function of modern central banks
especially in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. Alternatively, one could think of government
sponsored institutions, which extend collateralized loans, e.g. Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae in the
case of mortgages.
32This institutional arrangement is necessary for the very existence of an equilibrium. Indeed,
absent the upper-bound (given by the scarcity of her own resources) on the long-run interest that
a borrower can pay at the end of period 0, equilibria would fail to exist. Lin et al. (2010) allow
the interest to be paid in the second period, together with the capital, because there is a unique
borrower, so that the upper-bound on her long-run loan is given by the money created by the Bank.
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the collateral is stored by the borrower.33
Let C ⊂ L denote the non empty subset of durable commodities that are eligible
as collaterals for long-term loans. We think of the collateral space RC+ as naturally
embedded in the commodity space RL+ of period 0. At t = 0, agent h takes out a
collateralized long-term loan µh
0
/(1 + r0). The nominal interest rate is r0, and the
interests are paid at the end of the period, whereas the principal is paid back in the
next period.34 Agent h pledges a basket of goods κh
0
∈ RC+ as the collateral value of
her loan p0 · κh0 = µh0/(1 + r0). She must ask enough of commodity ` ∈ C so as to
effectively spend her loan in purchasing the corresponding collateral: q˜h0` ≥ p`0κh0`. At
t = 1, the agent will deliver min{ps · ghs (κh0) ; µh0/(1 + r0)} in state s.
3.3 Collateralized financial assets
In addition to commodities and money, K financial assets can be traded in state 0,
which deliver in the second period. The macrovariables are η := (r, p, pi), where:
r ∈ RN+ := interest rates on Bank loans, n ∈ N .
p = (p`s) ∈ RS
∗×L
+ := commodity prices.
pi := (pi1, ..., piK) ∈ RK+ := the price of assets.
Sometimes, we write η = (η(0), (ηs)s), breaking η into its state components.
Buying-and selling-nominal prices are identical. The bid-ask spread will be implic-
itly determined, at equilibrium, by the cost of borrowing inside money in order to
facilitate purchase.35
All asset deliveries are supposed to be non-negative, and must be made in money.
When the asset promise, Aks = (aks1, ..., aksL, aksm), includes commodities and money,









where ps ∈ RL+ is the spot commodity price in state s. Derivatives have pay-offs that
depend upon the fundamental macrovariables (see supra). For example, a call option
on firm j, with strike λj, pays off (Vsj − λj)+ in each state s ∈ S (and usually, the
strike is a function of some macrovariables). Another example is an inflation-indexed
promise, which delivers ps · Λs in state s ∈ S, where Λs ∈ RL+ is a fixed basket of
goods.
More generally, asset k ∈ K := {1, ..., K} promises pay-off (ps, 1)·Aks(η0, ηs) euros
in each state s ∈ S, where Aks(·, ·) is a continuous function of η0 and ηs. We impose
the following, fairly innocuous condition, which nevertheless seems to be new in the
literature:
Hypothesis on Derivative Delivery (HDD)
For each k and s, Aks(·) is polynomially dominated at infinity by the
macrovariables, i.e., ∃b ≥ 0 with
33As shown by Geanakoplos and Zame (2010), allowing for collateral to be warehoused or to be
held and used by the lender creates only notational difficulties.
34If both interest and principal were to be paid back at the end of period 1, the demand for
long-term loan in period 0 would not be bounded, even at equilibrium.
35Instead of imposing this cash-in-advance constraint—which is sometimes viewed as artificial,
(Duffie, 1990)—we could as well start with a bid-ask spread. As long as the spread can be linked with
the Central Bank’s monetary policy (through equations akin to (43) and (44)), the two approaches
(in terms of spread versus liquidity constraint) are equivalent in our setting.
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Aks(η) = O(||(r, p)||b),
where ||.|| is a norm on the space of macrovariables.
Assumption HDD says that asset deliveries do not grow too fast in the sense
that the quotient Aks(η)/ ||(r, p)||b remains bounded at infinity. It is verified if, say,
the delivery function Aks is semi-algebraic—which is always the case in discrete-time
finance industry.36 In this formulation of HDD, we assume that asset deliveries are
bounded in terms of other asset prices. Remark B) in the section 6 shows how to get
rid of this restriction.
Agent h can buy or sell each asset k at price pik. Because there are no a priori
endowments of assets, their sales are “short sales”. Notice that they are not a priori
bounded.37
Agents can only sell the asset k if they hold shares of some collateral. Asset k is
therefore associated with a vector, κk ∈ RL+, of collateral requirement.38 If an agent
sells one unit of asset k, she is required to hold κk` units of commodity ` as collateral.39
Since the same commodity can be used as collateral for different financial assets, the
agent is required to invest κk` in ` for each k ∈ K. This means that tranching is
not allowed. For simplicity also, only commodities are eligible as collaterals. In
particular, we do not allow assets to be used as collaterals (no pyramiding). For
simplicity again, we assume the following:
Assumption C. For every asset k, there exists some household h and
some ε > 0 such that eh0 ≥ εκk.
This restriction guarantees that every marketed asset can be sold by at least one
investor who holds (part of) the corresponding collateral as initial endowment. It
is automatically satisfied when, ∀k, κk` > 0 for a unique commodity `k. In general,
however, an arbitrary asset may require a combination of collaterals that nobody
holds as initial endowment. We will use this restriction only for the existence proof
(Theorem 1).
The return of asset k is the minimum between the total value of collateral and
the promise at that state:
Aks(η0, ηs) := min
{
(ps, 1) · Aks(η0, η1) , ps · ghs (κk)
}
. (12)
36If only for computational purposes, the exponential function (which fails to verify (HDD)) is
always replaced, at some point or another, by a polynomial approximation.
37In general equilibrium theory with exogenous incompleteness (see, e.g., Geanakoplos (1990)),
this unboundedness destroys the existence of financial equilibria. The addition of money, however,
suffices to restore existence Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003a).
38By contrast with the institutional arrangement for collateralized long-term loans, here, the
vector κk is exogenous. This is the formulation used in most of the literature devoted to default
in cashless economies, while the formulation we adopted for long-term loans (where the collateral
vector is endogenous) has been introduced by Lin et al. (2010). As mentioned we could adopt the
endogenous formulation for financial assets as well. We chose the exogenous one in order to show
the flexibility of our approach.
39For the sake of simplicity, we do not allow the collateral to be held by the lender or to be
warehoused (see Geanakoplos and Zame (2002)).
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Because of the scarcity of collaterals, collateral requirements introduce an en-
dogenous bound on short sales. When κk` = 0 for each k, `, there is no collateral
requirement, hence short sales are not limited. Notice that, at variance with Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997), but in accordance with Geanakoplos and Zame (2010), we
make the natural assumption that date 0 consumptions include goods not pledged
as collaterals.
3.4 Liquidity constraints
The sequence of events is as follows. In period 0, agents borrow money either from the
stock of outside money put on the loan markets by private lenders or from the Bank.
There are two loan markets: one for the short term—where the Bank injects the
stock, M0, of inside money—and one for the long-term—where the Bank injects M0.
On each market, an interest rate emerges (resp. r0 and r0) so as to clear the money
market. Next, the capital markets meet for the trade of financial assets, followed
by the commodity markets. After this, there is a move of chance and the economy
enters one of the states s ∈ S in period 1. In any state s ∈ S, there is a fresh disposal
of outside money and of Bank money Ms at an interest rate rs. Money markets in
state s are followed by another round of trade in spot commodities. Then, all the
deliveries take place simultaneously: agents deliver on the asset they sold. Finally
agents settle their debts with the Bank and the Bank with the private lenders.40
For any fixed choice of macrovariables η, let us now describe the set Σhη of feasible
choices of h ∈ H, and the outcome that accrues to h as a function of η and of her
strategy, σh ∈ Σhη .
We denote:




:= collateral of long-term loans pledged by h
αhk := asset k ∈ K sold by h
qhs` := commodity ` sold by h in state s ∈ S∗.
A tilde on any variable will denote the money spent on it, i.e.,
µ˜hn := money deposited (money spent on Bank bonds of type n) by h
α˜hk := money spent by h in asset k ∈ K



















must satisfy a set of liquidity and physical constraints.
Period 0. The choice σh must satisfy the following liquidity constraints:
(i) Bank deposits in period 0 ≤ money endowed with:41
µ˜h0 + µ˜
h
0 ≤ mh0 . (13)
40To keep the anonymity of markets, all transactions on the monetary markets pass through the
Bank.
41In other words, there is no private banking system in this paper.
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(ii) Expenditures on commodities and assets ≤ money left in (13) + money














With expenditures from money borrowed on long-term loans comes the collateral
requirement:




and q˜h0` ≥ p`0κh0` ∀` ∈ C (15)
Finally, σh must verify the following budget constraints:
(iii) Money repaid (or received)42 on loan 0 ≤money left in (14) + money received
from commodity sales + money obtained from sales of financial assets:
µh0 − (1 + r0)µ˜h0 ≤ ∆(14) + p0 · qh0 + pi · αh (16)





− r0µ˜h0 ≤ ∆(16) (17)
Period 1. Similarly, in each state s ∈ S of period 1, we must have:
(v)s Bank deposits in state s ≤ money inventoried from period 0 + fresh endow-
ment of outside money (if any43):
µ˜hs ≤ ∆(17) +mhs (18)








(vii)s Cash needed for delivering on assets≤ money left in (19) + money obtained




k ≤ ∆(19) + ps · qhs . (20)
(vii)s Money repaid on short-term loan s and long-term 0 ≤ money left in (20)


















42That is, there is netting on loan.
43Observe that we do not impose that initial endowments of outside money in the second period
be positive.
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The choice σh must as well follow a set of physical constraints.44 In period 0:
qh0` ≤ eh0` ∀` ∈ L. (22)
This condition means that the total amount of commodities sent to the clearing
house cannot exceed the quantity of commodities at hand.
The consumption that accrues to h in period 0 is xh0 ∈ RL+:
xh0` := e
h








k ∀` ∈ L, (23)
The condition xh0` ≥ 0 means that the initial endowment plus the net trade of h
exceed the quantity hold as collateral (for long-term loans and financial assets45).
The physical constraints in period s ∈ S are:









0) ∀s, ` ∈ S× L, (24)
This condition says that the total amount of commodities supplied in state s in
the second period cannot exceed the initial endowment + the collateral stored from
period 0 + what remains from the bundle consumed at time 0.



















∀s, ` ∈ S× L, (25)
The final portfolio of h is:
φhsk := −αhsk +
α˜hsk
piks
∀s, k ∈ S×K. (26)
We furthermore impose the net position conditions:
µhn.µ˜
h
n = 0, ∀n ∈ N, (27)
To understand these conditions, note that there is an indeterminacy in the players’
actions, related to the money borrowed or deposited on short-term loans (n ∈ S∗).
Indeed, constraints (13) and (14), or (18) and (19), do not prevent an agent from
being both a borrower and a lender in the short-term loan market s. Only her net
situation is relevant in our liquidity constraints. Our condition means that agent
h is either a borrower or a lender in each short-term loan s. There is no loss of
generality in doing so: If an action satisfies our liquidity constraints, there exists
an equivalent action that satisfies this additional, non-redundancy requirement. It




, 0) and µhs =




, 0). The hereby redefined action still satisfies the liquidity
constraints and also our net position conditions.
When n = 0, on the contrary, the net situation is not equivalent to a position
where an agent is on both side of the market, because he can default on the money he
44Such constraints are standard in strategic market games, cf. Giraud (2003).
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has borrowed. The liquidity constraints allow an agent to default on the borrowing
side, while the Central Bank pays back her principal on the lending side. To avoid
this odd situation, we therefore impose also our net position condition for long-term
loans.
We therefore define the convex feasible set, Σhη , as being the set of actions satis-
fying liquidity constraints (13), (14), (16), (18), (19), and (21), physical constraints
(22) and (24), long-term collateral pledge (15), and net position conditions (27).
This choice yields utility uh(xh) to player h.
3.5 Collateral Monetary equilibrium
Our definition extends the one introduced in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b) by
adding the possibility of default both on financial assets and long-term loans.
We say that 〈η, (σh)h∈H〉 is a Collateral Monetary Equilibrium (cme) for the
economy E := 〈(uh, eh,mh)h∈H,A,M0,M0, (Ms)s∈S〉 if:
(i) All agents maximize:





) ∀h ∈ H
(ii) All markets clear:

























We will denote Ks the money that the central bank received in the second period















Note that Ks ≤M0, with equality if no agent defaults on her long-term loan.
Remark that, when cast as a (type-symmetric) Nash equilibrium of the underlying
strategic market game, this definition rests on the implicit assumption that players
cannot condition their actions in period 1 on the actions observed from period 0.
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This is consistent with the anonymity property of large markets.46 Prices are the
unique signal on which players coordinate.
Remark 3.1 Let us briefly comment on some specific aspects of the model that are
responsible for its upshot.
a) As in most strategic market games, every transaction that an agent under-
takes requires the physical transfer of money out of what he has on hand at that
time. This amounts to various liquidity constraints. The upshot is that we have a
well-defined physical process in which effect follows cause in a time sequence. By
contrast, general equilibrium analysis steers clear of liquidity constraints because all
transactions are imagined to occur simultaneously. The point of the present contri-
bution is to go beyond this and to analyse the effects of liquidity constraints when
default is permitted to occur on markets with collateralized assets. As we assume
that each type of investor is represented by a continuum of negligible clones, they
all take prices as given, which simplifies the analysis. The existence proof, however,
provides the full-blown double auction underlying our model (see the Appendix).
b) We assume that agents may default on certain promises and not on others,
and that the only consequence of default is forfeiture of collateral. For pawn shop
loans, overnight repurchase agreements, margin loans and home mortgages, this as-
sumptions is relatively close to reality. Repo loans, and mortgages in many states,
are literally non-recourse loans. In the rest of the states, lenders rarely come after
borrowers for more money beyond taking the house.
c) Money plays here all its different roles: it can be hold for transactional purposes
(because of the liquidity constraints detailed supra) and as a store of value between
periods 0 and 1. But it can also be used as an asset that permits transferring
wealth from one state to another in period 1, hence as an insurance tool: if short-
term interest rates are expected to be very high in some second-period state s, then
agents will try to acquire money in advance in period 0. Furthermore, there may be
also a speculative demand for money: inventorying money from period 0 to period
1 is equivalent to holding an implicit (risk-less, nominal) asset. If the return of this
asset becomes more attractive, a speculative demand for it will appear. And finally,
if commodity prices are expected to increase in the second period, there will be a
demand for money on the long-term loan market driven by the fear for inflation.
It should be clear, however, that there is no money illusion: multiplying both
outside and inside money by some constant λ solely amounts to computing prices,
say, in cents rather than in euros. Since expectations are rational, the Central Bank’s
policy is also perfectly anticipated, so that the results to follow are not due to some ir-
rational anticipations. And nevertheless, we shall see that the “stylized facts” evoked
in the Introduction can be recovered within the present setting.
46See Giraud and Stahn (2003) for the impact of allowing for non-trivial monitoring in strategic
market games with incomplete security markets.
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4 General properties of Collateral Monetary Equi-
libria
Introducing collateral constraints in a model of incomplete markets has two well-
known consequences. The standard non-arbitrage argument that lies at the core of
pricing theory in the complete markets benchmark does no more hold, even at equilib-
rium, in our set-up where markets are endogenously incomplete due to the scarcity of
collaterals. “Efficient financial markets” are usually said to be characterized by price
processes that follow random walks. As is well-known, this martingale property is
satisfied in gei models (independently of the Pareto-inefficiency of its equilibria, see,
e.g., Geanakoplos (1990)), but need no more be satisfied in our set-up with collateral
requirements: when the collateral constraint is binding, its actual price is the sum of
two shadow prices, the marginal value attributed to it by its marginal purchaser plus
its value as a collateral (see, e.g., Cao (2010)). Hence, the market incompleteness
induced by the collateralization of assets is of specific nature when compared to more
classical models of market incompleteness. The second consequence is that equilib-
rium pricing is no more linear. Hence, the celebrated Modigliani-Miller theorem also
fails in our setting as in any environment with non-linear pricing rules—which has
long been recognized (Geanakoplos, 1990; Hellwig, 1982; Stiglitz, 1982).
4.1 Gains to trade
In this section, we adapt the intratemporal gains-to-trade assumption borrowed from
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b) to our context with default.
Let xh ∈ RS∗×L+ be any feasible allocation for household h. For any γ ≥ 0, we
say that x = (xh)h ∈
(
RS∗×L+
)H is not γ-Pareto optimal in state s if there exist some
trades (τhs )h ∈
(
RL)H in state s ∈ S∗, such that∑
h
τhs = 0 (feasibility of trades) (32)
xhs + τ
h
s ∈ RL+ for all h ∈ H (consumability) (33)
uh(xh[γ, τhs ]) ≥ uh(xh) ∀h ∈ H, with at least one strict inequality (improvement)
(34)
where, for every ` ∈ L,
x[γ, τh]t` :=
{
xht` if t ∈ S∗ \ {s}




} for t = s.
In words, the trades, τh, considered as candidates to γ-Pareto-improve xh involve a
tax of γ/(1+γ) on trade. Of course, 0-Pareto-optimality coincides with the standard
notion of Pareto-optimality. The gains to trade, γs(x), in state s at a point x ∈(
RS∗×L+
)H is defined as the supremum of all γ for which x is not γ-Pareto-optimal in
state s.
The stock of inside money injected in state s isMs. The gains-to-trade hypothesis
introduced in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b) compares the measure γs(x) with a
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ratio of outside to inside money in state s ∈ S given by: mˆs/Ms. In our context, we
need to slightly modify the definition given by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b) to mˆ
in order to account for the possibility of default. Defaulting, indeed, can be viewed
as a way to endogenously create money at equilibrium, hence to expand the amount
of “outside” money available to traders. At variance, however, with the standard no-
default case, this amount of “outside money” becomes endogenous (since the interest
rate charged on long-term loans is endogenous). Everything goes as if traders could
not create more money by defaulting than their total credit extension on the long-
term loan.47 For our purposes, it therefore turns out that it will be sufficient to
take:










s . Thus mˆs = M0 +m0 +ms.
The gains-to-trade hypothesis can now be formulated as follows. For every state
s ∈ S, let us denote by Xs the subset of feasible consumption bundles that involve
































∀h ∈ H, xhs = ehs + ghs (yh)
}
(36)
The first condition implies that the allocation (xh)h is feasible (involving possi-
bly trades among players and intertemporal storage), the second condition that it
involves no trade in state s.




This assumption requires that there be gains to trade in every state s ∈ S in
period 1, but not necessarily in period 0. It also rules out the case of only one
commodity per state, because then, any feasible and consumable allocation would
be automatically 0-Pareto optimal. Similarly, it rules out the representative agent
case where H = 1, because, again, this would lead to Pareto-optimality for free.
If initial endowments in the economy E are not Pareto-optimal, then asMs → +∞
leaving the economy otherwise fixed, the Gains-to-trade hypothesis will sooner or
later be satisfied.
4.2 Existence
The next result (whose proof is in the Appendix A.1) extends the existence theorem
of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b) to the case where households can default on the
delivery of collateralized derivatives or on their long-term loans. Alternatively, it
extends the existence result of Geanakoplos and Zame (2010) by introducing money
47See Step 6 in the proof of Theorem 1.
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in their incomplete markets economy with collateralized assets. Similarly, it extends
Lin et al. (2010) to the case where investors can default not only on the Bank’s
long-term loans but also on their financial assets. The three key ingredients of our
approach are: a) the introduction of our HDD hypothesis; b) the combination of both
an endogenous collateral constraint for long-term loans and an exogenous collateral
constraint for financial assets ; c) the adaptation of the gains-to-trade assumption
introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003a) in order to cope with defaultable
assets and loans ; d) that some money be injected (otherwise monetary equilibria
trivially cease to exist) : m0 + M0 > 0. Notice, therefore, that we do not impose
that money be injected in the short-run, provided the long-run monetary market is
active.
We prove existence under two distinct environments. In both frames,m0+M0 > 0
is assumed. Now, either A) aggregate outside money is positive in period 0 (m0 > 0);
or B) m0 = 0 but M0 > 0. Notice that, in environment A, the Central Bank
may refuse to intervene on the long-term loan market (i.e., a cme exists even when
M0 = 0). Conversely, in environment B, short-run loan markets may be close. In
this case, however, the Bank needs to pump in a positive stock of inside money in
the long-term market for equilibria to exist. Moreover, in both environments, an
equilibrium exists even absent of any financial asset.
Remark 4.1 The situation ruled out by environments A and B is the one where
m0 = M0 = 0. Whenever the latter situation arises, then, every cme coincides with
a barter collateral equilibrium as defined by Geanakoplos and Zame (2010). Indeed,
then, interest rates will all be zero48 while prices and inside money are homogeneous
of degree 0, so that only relative prices are determined by the equilibrium conditions.
As a consequence, the two environments precisely capture the ingredients that are
necessary for the endogenous determination of the price level: Either there must be
some outside money (in which case, the interplay of inside and outside money fixes
absolute prices, as in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003a)), either there is a collateral
constraint associated with long-run loans (in which case, the interplay between this
constraint and the quantity of money pumped in by the Bank on the long-run markets
suffice to pin down nominal prices, as in Lin et al. (2010)).
Theorem 1 Under environment A or B, any monetary economy E verifying our
standing assumptions together with Assumption C, HDD and the gains-to-trade hy-
pothesis has a cme.
Existence holds therefore for a broad class of economies involving real and/or
nominal assets, options, derivatives, and even more complicated non-linear assets.
In the standard framework with no money and no collateral constraints, the presence
of such assets implies that the space of feasible income transfers does not depend con-
tinuously on commodity prices, so that equilibrium may not exist.49 In the present
framework however, there are two forces which help restore existence: both the col-
lateral requirements and the cash-in-advance constraints place an endogenous bound
48This will follow from Proposition 4.2.
49See Darrell and Shafer (1985) for a generic existence proof, Ku and Polemarchakis (1990) for a
robust example of non-existence with options.
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on short-sales. The first one because of the scarcity of collateralized assets (see,
e.g., Geanakoplos and Zame (2002)), the second, because of the scarcity of money
(see, e.g., Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b)). As in the standard incomplete markets
setup (see Radner (1972) for instance), a lower-bound on short-sales eliminates the
discontinuity and guarantees existence.
It should be stressed that no Gains-to-trade hypothesis is needed in period 0
in order to guarantee the existence of an active Collateral Monetary Equilibrium.
Nevertheless, it should be clear that the Pareto-optimality of any period 0 equilibrium
allocation depends upon r0 and r0. The smaller are these interest rates, the closer
will be the allocation to optimality. As a consequence, monetary authorities may
be willing to increase M0 and M0 in order to improve the optimality of trades. The
next section is devoted to the implications of such a monetary policy. As a matter
of preparation, we need to understand a couple of properties of the equilibrium yield
curve.
4.3 The yield curve
It is easy to show that money, in our model, is non-neutral (Dubey and Geanakoplos,
2003a,b). Nevertheless, we get the analogue of a quantity theory of money:





p0 · qh0 ≤
∑
h
mh0 +M0 +M0. (37)
With equality, as soon as r0 > 0.
(ii) For every state s ∈ S, one has∑
h






mh0 +Ms +M0 − r0M0 − r0M0 (38)
and50 ∑
h
ps · qhs ≤ (1 + rs)Ms +Ks (39)
With equality, as soon as rs > 0.
Proof. For (i), the liquidity constraint (14) is binding. For (ii), (19) is binding as
well as (21). See the Appendix A.2 for a detailed proof. 
The next Proposition describes the term structure of interest rate, showing that
the full interplay of all the demands for money can be captured in our model (trans-
action, precaution, speculation, storage, insurance against inflation).
Proposition 4.2 At any cme,
(i) rs ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S∗;







) ∀s ∈ S with an equality if, and only
if, there is no default on the long-run money market, 0, in state s;











, each storage mapping reduces to the identity map: ghs (x) = x ∀x, h, and all
50Recall that Ks is the money received by the central bank on long-term loans, see (31).
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goods are eligible as collateral C = L. Then r0 ≥ mins∈S 1 + r0 − 1/(1 + rs) with
strict inequality unless all rs are identical ∀s ∈ S ;




0)/M0 =: µ0(m,M) and rs ≤ µs(m,M) ∀s ∈ S,








(v) r0 < 1 + r0.
Remark 4.2 Observe that, under both environments considered in subsection 4.2.






(i) Otherwise, a player could improve her profile by borrowing more money, spend-
ing part of this extra-cash on a commodity, and inventorying the money to pay back
the extra-loan.
(ii) No agent has some money on hand at the end of period s (for she would
rather spend it or borrow less), so that ∆(21) = 0. This yields






mh0 +M0 −Ks (40)
The result follows because Ks ≤ M0 with equality if, and only if, there is no-












0 . Because M0 > 0, at least one player h is
a net borrower on M0. Suppose the claim is false. Let h borrow  less on M0 but
more on M0. Player h can still act in period 0 as before: she buys the same goods
with the 0 money as with the 0 money (because C = L she can pledge them as
collateral), and she ends up with the same final utility (because only second period
consumption matters and storage map are identity). Because she has less to pay on
her loan 0, she inventories (1+r0−r0) into period 1. She deposits only /(1+rs) on
Ms. This will exactly reimburse the principal of her long-loan. Now, she is endowed
with the extra-money ∆((1 + r0 − r0)− 1/(1 + rs)) (which is positive in every state
s by assumption) that she can spend to increase her utility. A contradiction.
If the rεs are not identical and if there is equality in the formula, then the extra-
money in every state s is positive in some second-period state, and some agent can
still increase her utility.





0 . For the inequality on rs, see step 6 of the proof of Theorem 1
in Appendix A.1.
(v) Suppose that r0 ≥ 1 + r0. Instead of borrowing on the long-term monetary
market, the agent h can borrow short-term, buy the same goods as before and enjoys
them from period 0 on, before paying back the loan with the money she would have
spent on the long-term loan interest. This increases her utility. A contradiction.

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Corollary 4.1 (i) Suppose that M0 (resp. M0) grows to infinity. Then, along any
sequence of corresponding cme, r0 → 0+ (resp. r0 → 0+).
(ii) Suppose that Mn →∞, with n ∈ {0, 0, s ∈ S}. Then, if rn remains bounded
below above 0, some default must occur on the long-run market, 0.
Proof.
(i) is a simple consequence of (38). (ii) follows from Proposition (4.2) (ii).

4.4 Fiscal deficit and bankruptcy of the Central Bank
When outside money is interpreted in terms of public expenditure, property (ii) has
an important implication in terms of fiscal deficit.51 On the left hand of the inequality
(ii), there is the interest revenue of the Bank, and on the right, the Treasury’s
expenditures. This equation thus says that the Treasury is balancing its budget
on the long-run as long as there is no default, although Ms and mhs may be quite
arbitrary: seigniorage (i.e., r0M0 + r0M0 + rsMs) covers exactly the cost of public
expenditures. On the other hand, whenever there are defaults on the long loan
market, in some state s, the public deficit is given by:






s )− r0M0 − r0M0 − rsMs = Ks −M0.
Whenever there is no outside money in the economy (i.e., ms = 0 ∀s ∈ S∗), then (ii)
implies that a positive long-run interest rate, r0 > 0 is only possible, at equilibrium,
when there is some default on the long-run market. In the latter case, the Central
Bank loses the difference,M0−Ks, between the money it lends and the cash it finally
recovers. If this difference exceeds the Central Bank’s equity, this means that our
equilibrium concept is quite compatible with the Bank being bankrupt. Theorem
2 below will even show that, under certain circumstances (scenario (iib)), the Bank
may lose its total claim (i.e., Ks = 0) —a situation in which the Treasury would
have to recapitalize it. To take but an example, within its LTRO programme, the
ECB lent about e1 trillion between December 2011 and February 2012 over 3 years
at 1% rate, while its equity amounts to e80 billion.
4.5 Bid-ask spread





. Consider some pair, 〈η, σh〉, of macrovariable and
strategy profile. For each financial asset k, denote the corresponding final portfolio





51As already said, several alternative interpretations of outside money are conceivable: When
viewed as cash inherited from some unmodelled past default, the conclusions of this subsection fail.
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Equation (43) below says that, in the first period, the buying price of commodity `
(resp. asset k) is p`0 (resp. pik), while its selling price is p`0/(1+r0) (resp. pik/(1+r0)).
The ratio r0/(1 + r0) can therefore be interpreted as a bid-ask spread. Similarly, the
spread on the commodity market in state s is rs/(1 + rs).
Proposition 4.3 Let 〈η, σh〉 be a macrovariable and a strategy of player h such that
σh ∈ Σhη for every h. Then,




p0 · zh−0 + pi · θh−







ps · zh+s −
1
1 + rs




where ∆(17) + mhs is the money in the hand of agent h at the beginning of period
1 and γhs := min
{


















money paid back by agent h on the long-loan market and on securities.


















p0 · zh+0 + pi · θh+ − 11+r0
(
p0 · zh−0 + pi · θh−
)












For the last inequality we have subtracted (16) divided by 1 + r0 from (14), and used
the fact that µh0 = 0 and ∆(14) = 0. Since 1 + r0 > r0, µ˜h0(r0/(1 + r0)− 1) ≤ 0, the
inequality follows.
To prove the inequality in the second period, one proceeds in the same way, noting
that (19) is binding. 
5 Robust liquidity trap versus financial crash
As shown by the Gains-to-trade hypothesis, the monetary authority will be able to
improve the efficiency of trade, and thus total real output, by increasing supplies of
Bank money or, equivalently, by lowering interest rates. We now show that, when
doing so, monetary authorities face a universal dilemma. This dilemma, when stated
in full generality, says that three, and only three, scenarios are compatible with the
equilibrium condition: either the economy falls into a liquidity trap in period 0, or
the Central Bank circumvents the trap but at the cost of fueling domestic inflation,
else the monetary policy encourages impatient or optimistic agents in accumulating
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debts in period 0, but at the cost that, with positive probability, deleveraging in the
second period forces agents to cut spending, which results in a collapse of trades and
default on the long-run market—actually, a complete loss of its loans by the Central
Bank.
Define the monetary policy of the Central Bank as involving a collectionM :=
〈Ms(·)〉s∈S, of mappings taking value in R+, where, for each s, Ms : M0 7→ Ms.
The collection, (M0,M), defines the Central Bank’s monetary policy and is publicly
announced before markets open in the first period. Given a monetary policy, under
the assumptions of Theorem 1, there exists a cme associated with any choice of M0.
In the next result, we fix a monetary policy and consider the impact of varying M0.
We call a spot liquidity trap in state s a cme where the short-term interest rate in s
hits the zero lower-bound, rs = 0 (but rs′ might differ from 0 for s′ 6= s).
In the sequel, we call liquidity trap in state s ∈ S∗ the following situation: there
exists some M∗0 such that ∀M0 ≥ M∗0 , r0(M0) = 0, (resp. rs(M0) = 0) and house-
holds horde at least M0 − M∗0 (resp.
[
Ms(M0) − Ms(M∗0 )
]+) as unspent money
balances in period 0 (resp. state s) and prices remain constant, p0(M0) = p0(M∗0 )
(resp. ps(M0) = ps(M∗0 ).
Theorem 2 Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 1 are in force. Fix a mone-
tary policy, (M0,M) and let M0 → +∞. One of the three following situations must
arise at equilibrium:
(i) A liquidity trap occurs in some state s ∈ S∗;
(ii) or r0(M0) > 0 and rs > 0, for every s ∈ S, as M0 → +∞. Then
Either (iia) commodity prices explode to infinity in all states s ∈ S∗ (i.e.,





s (M0)→ 0 as M0 → +∞, i.e., trades vanish in some state
s. This is the “collapse scenario”. It admits two variants. In the first one,
the price level at s increases to infinity as M0 → +∞. This is the “debt-
inflationary” variant. In the second variant, there is no inflation but the
collapse of trades is accompanied by a complete loss of the Central Bank
on the long-run monetary market (i.e., Ks = 052). This is the “crash
variant” of the collapse scenario.
Proof. Take some (M0,M) as given. A cme exists for every choice of M0. Suppose
the monetary authority increases M0, and keeps (M0,M) fixed. For every given M0,
a finite amount of inside money,Ms :=Ms(M0), is injected at time 1. Thus, the total
stock of money available to be spent in state s is no more thanM0+Ms(M0)+m0+ms.
Three, and only three, cases are in order, which are not mutually exclusive and
partially overlap. At the end, however, each case must lead to one of the three
scenarios of the Theorem.
(α) A liquidity trap emerges in state s ∈ S∗: there is someM∗0 such thatM0 ≥M∗0
implies r0 = 0 or rs = 0 for some s. The hoarding of real money balances thereafter
increases proportionately with M0 − M∗0 . The economy has therefore reached a
liquidity trap when M0 ≥M∗0 . This first case coincides with scenario (i).
52Recall that Ks is defined by (31). Of course, whenever the long-run monetary market is closed,
Ks = 0 in every scenario.
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(β) Suppose, on the contrary, that rs > 0 for every s ∈ S∗. Assume, furthermore,
that the quantity Ms =Ms(M0) increases to infinity with M0 for every s ∈ S.
Note that, because of Proposition (4.2) (iv), second period spot interest rates
rs → 0+ as M0 → +∞, for every s ∈ S. Will this expansionary scenario inevitably
lead to inflation in both periods? We begin with period 0. Transactions are uniformly
bounded—either because of the physical constraints on commodities or because of the
collateral requirements on derivatives (22) together with the scarcity of collaterals.
Thus, it follows from r0 > 0, hence (37), that the equilibrium price of at least
one commodity or one asset (possibly both) must grow to infinity. Next, in the
second period state s, if Ms grows to infinity for every s, everything else being kept
fixed, then the cme allocation will eventually converge to some (barter) collateral
equilibrium.53 Indeed, if follows from Proposition (4.2)(iv) that rs → 0+ while
all cash balances (money in the right-hand-side of (18) as well as debts) vanish.
Therefore, since at the limit “real transactions” will be nearly constant (and equal to
some asymptotic barter collateral equilibrium), the further increase of inside money
will induce an increase of at least one price as a consequence of (37) and (39) (recall
that rs > 0).
This is the “inflationary scenario” (iia).
(γ) Assume, now, that we are neither in case (α), so r0 > 0 and rs > 0 for every
s, nor in case (β): in some state s, Ms is uniformly bounded for M0.




s (M0), of equilibrium aggregate supply of spot
commodities in this state is bounded from below by some (L-dimensional) lower-
bound, q, independent from M0. This means that spot prices, ps, in state s, must
have an upper-bound independent fromM0, as follows from (19) and the boundedness
of Ms. As a consequence, commodity and asset prices at time 0 must be bounded by
some constant, say, K, independent of M0. Otherwise, indeed, every agent h could
sell ε > 0 of any commodity she is positively endowed with at time 0, and buy the
whole economy for state s of period 1. Similarly, security prices must be uniformly




0` > 0, for
each security there exists at least one household which is furnished in the commodities
that are eligible as collateral for j, and which could otherwise go short in this security
in order to buy the whole economy in the next period.54
The inside money borrowed on loan 0 must be spent in time 0 : no agent would borrow
money on loan 0 at positive interest unless she is going to spend it in that very period.
But the boundedness of prices and of quantities (because of physical constraints)





qhs (M0) = 0. (45)
This is the “collapse scenario” (iib). This third scenario admits two variants according
to the behavior of Ms(M0).
(γ1) If Ms(M0) is bounded away from zero (i.e., ∃η > 0, Ms(M0) ≥ η ∀M0),
equality (39) then implies that ||ps(M0)|| → +∞, and we are also in the inflationary
scenario (iia). This shows that inflation and collapse of trade at some second period
53See, e.g., Geanakoplos and Zame (2010).
54See steps 3 and 4 of the proof of the existence Theorem 1 in the Appendix A.1 for same
arguments in details.
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state s are not incompatible and can be viewed as an account of a debt-inflation
phenomenon.
(γ2) If there is no inflation in state s (for this it is necessary that limM0→∞Ms(M0) =
0). Then (39) implies that Ks = 0. This is the “crash variant”.

Remark 5.1 Given our Gains-to-trade hypothesis, no-trade in second-period state
s can only occur because of the deleveraging of over-endebted agents. This can be
seen from the liquidity constraints: if no agent h can borrow money in the short-run
in order to purchase commodity (although we know that at least two households
would have a common interest to trade) so as to fulfill (19), this can only be due
to the constraints (20) and (21) where the delivery of assets and/or long-run loans
absorb all the cash available to h.
The next corollary shows that unconventional monetary policy (that consists
in intervening on the long-run monetary market) does not help the Central Bank
circumvent the monetary dilemma. Suppose, therefore, that (M0, (Ms)s∈S) are fixed,
and let the Bank choose M0.
Corollary 5.1 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, suppose thatM0 → +∞, while
(M0, (Ms)s∈S) is kept fixed. The same conclusion as in Theorem 2 folllows.
Proof.
The proof follows verbatim that of Theorem 2. The contradiction induced by the
Quantity Theory equation (4.1) arises in the same way when M0 → +∞ as when
M0 → +∞. 
Remark 5.2 One could imagine that the Bank increases both M0 and M0 simul-
taneously. It readily follows from the proof of both Theorem 2 and Corollary (5.1)
that the same conclusion would apply.
The strength of Theorem 2 and Corollary (5.1) is to show that there is actually
no escape road from what we have called the monetary dilemma : Either the Central
Bank commits to fostering inflation, or it takes the risk of either a liquidity trap or a
collapse of trades due to a crash on the long-run monetary market. Scenarios (i) and
(ii) are obviously mutually exclusive so that, if neither (i) nor (iia) occur, then (iib)
must hold. What this dilemma does not prove is that each of these three regimes
may actually take place. This is why it needs to be supplemented by the Example
of section 2. The dilemma does also not claim that the three scenarios are mutually
exclusive: one may have inflation in spot commodity prices of state s together with
a liquidity trap in period 0. Similarly, a liquidity trap in state s is compatible with
inflation in period 0.
Remark 5.3 In case a liquidity trap occurs in the first period, as the Bank increases
M0, holding M0 fixed, the short-term nominal interest rate, r0, will eventually hit
the zero lower-bound while M0 is still finite. Further increases of M0 will have no
effect on prices or on trades, but simply induce the households to hold larger real
money balances. Households will borrow the extra money at zero cost, hoard it in
their pockets, and then return it unused at the end of period 0. At this level of
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generality, the emergence of a liquidity trap does not have any welfare implication.
However, if a liquidity trap occurs in environment A, the resulting allocation must
be Pareto-suboptimal. Indeed, in environment A, outside money is non-zero, so that
Proposition (4.2) (ii) implies rs > 0 for some s ∈ S∗, so that trades must be inefficient.
Observe that this “liquidity trap” is robust to any (infinitesimal) perturbations of
the fundamentals of the economy. Therefore, it should not be confused with the
phenomenon exhibited in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b), where, absent collateral
constraints, it is shown that a liquidity trap emerges as soon as the underlying
barter gei economy (i.e., the incomplete markets economy where Ms = +∞ for
each s ∈ S∗) has no competitive equilibrium. Indeed, it is known from Darrell
and Shafer (1985) that, generically, this barter gei economy admits an equilibrium,
which implies that the liquidity trap of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b) is non-
generic. Here, by contrast, it may be robust, as shown by the example of section
2.
The next corollary provides a sufficient condition for a first-period liquidity trap
to occur.
Corollary 5.2 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, suppose M0 → +∞. If trades
in a state s ∈ S are bounded away from 0 (∑h qhs (M0) ≥ ε, for some ε > 0 in-
dependent from M0) and Ms(M0) is bounded, then a first-period liquidity trap must
occur.
Proof.
The argument also closely follows the proof of Theorem (2): since a Ms is
bounded, and trades don’t vanish in the second period, second-period prices must be
bounded. Since we are at equilibrium, first-period prices must be upper-bounded as
well. (4.1) then implies that there exists some M∗0 for which r0(M0) = 0 ∀M0 ≥M∗0 .

The next Corollary offers a different look at the monetary dilemma, starting
from the various options that are available to the central banker. Its proof follows
immediately from that of Theorem 2) and Corollary (5.1).
Corollary 5.3 Within the set-up of Theorem 2, suppose that either M0 or M0 →
+∞, and the economy does not reach a liquidity trap.
(i) If Ms(·)→∞, the level of prices in state s grows to infinity in state s ∈ S.
(ii) If the Central Bank wants to avoid inflation in state s, then it must decide
for a harsh monetary contraction, namely Ms(·)→ 0+. But at the cost of being sure
to lead the economy to the crash variant of scenario (iib) of Theorem 2, i.e., to a
collapse of trades and a crash on the long-run market.
(iii) Finally, if Ms(·) is caped and floored above 0 (independently of M0 and M0),
the “debt-inflationary variant” takes place: an unlimited growth of prices (as either
M0 or M0 increases) together with a collapse of trades.
Remark 5.4 The inflationary scenario (iia) means that, when the amount of in-
jected inside money lies above a certain threshold (which depends upon the char-
acteristics of the economy), then, the classical dichotomy holds and inflation is the
sole output of further monetary injection. Below this threshold, however, an increase
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of injected money has an ambiguous impact.55 This leaves some room for an “opti-
mal corridor” where an expansionary monetary policy is sufficiently credible to avoid
scenario (i) but not unduly “laxist”, so as to avoid unnecessary inflation.
Remark 5.5 Suppose that, in each second period-state, there exists at least one
consumer who derives no utility from (part of) her initial endowment. At equilibrium,




s (M0) will be bounded from below in each
state s. In this peculiar case, the crash scenario cannot occur, and we are only left
with scenarios (i) and (iia).
6 Some concluding comments
Let us close this paper with a few comments.
A) This paper does not attempt to provide a unified analysis of the global crisis
that started in 2007. Nevertheless, the model presented above, and its main results,
shed some light about what we may have learned from the crisis and the policy issues
raised by the response of the authorities to it. The monetary dilemma highlighted by
Theorem (2) states that there are three, and only three, scenarios compatible with
the Nash equilibrium conditions:
- scenario (iia): The size of injected money, (M0, (Ms)s) allows the efficiency of
trades to be improved at the cost of possibly unbounded inflation in commodity and
asset prices in both periods.
- scenario (i): Inflation is prevented in the first period but at the cost of a liquidity
trap.
- scenario (iib): overaccumulation of debt in financial markets leads to a global
crash in the second period.
The introduction of collateral requirements into monetary general equilibrium
analysis enables emphasizing the role of leveraging as one of the microeconomic
roots of financial crashes. Indeed, as shown by Section 2 above, the larger the
leverage ratio, the higher are the debts of optimistic investors in case of default. It
has been argued, e.g., by Adrian and Shin (2010) that, even in the absence of a real
bankruptcy, the very fact that a bank’s assets have lost value implies a sudden rise in
the leverage ratio, which is likely to lead the bank to sell off assets or restrict credit
in order to deleverage.56 This, however, is a partial equilibrium argument. Here, we
can recast the argument within a general equilibrium framework: it is the shift of
wealth between optimistic investors and pessimistic ones that can create a dramatic
fall in prices and, eventually, a crash.57
This is not to say that our story depicts financial crashes as “black swans”, i.e.,
as large-impact, low-probability events against which any protection would be ex-
ceedingly costly.58 According to our model, there are two ways to circumvent the
55This confirms the remark already made for one-shot economies by Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2003a).
56Large European banks in 2007 had leverage ratios between 20 in the UK and 35 in Switzerland
(see Panetta et al. (2009)).
57See Geanakoplos (2001) for a seminal statement of this phenomenon, ?, Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), and Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), for further work.
58For a defense of the “Black Swan” viewpoint, see Blanckfein (2009).
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risk of a big crash. The first one consists in turning to a contractionnary monetary
policy—at the cost of running the risk of falling into the liquidity trap (i.e., of shifting
from scenario (iib) to scenario (i)). The second way consists in regulating financial
markets so as to reduce their leverage ratio (driven by β in the Example of Section
2)—at the cost of having to accept a high inflation rate for consumer prices whenever
the monetary policy turns out to be too expansionary.
B) The interplay between money and collaterals makes it possible to show that
monetary policy and financial markets are deeply connected. It has been argued, at
least since 2008, that the scope of the Central Bank’s supervision of inflation should
be enlarged so as to include inflation of financial assets. This debate can be recast
within our general equilibrium framework with rational expectations. Indeed, the
quantity, M0, of money injected into the short-term loans market may fuel inflation
of asset prices when leverage in the financial markets is sufficiently large. This means
that one explanation of the Great Moderation (and of the fact that consumer price
inflation remained rather subdued throughout the 2000–06 period) might rest in the
sharp increase of leverage ratios in financial markets. Despite the strong growth
of the world monetary base (15% each year as of 1997, 30% since 2007) we did
not observe the domestic inflation we should have experienced according to a naive
interpretation of the Quantity Theory of Money (equation (37)) because this huge
amount of fresh liquidity migrated from the real sector to the financial sphere.
On the other hand, however, Theorem 2 shows that the deflation risk is perfectly
compatible with rational expectations and market clearing. Thus, when then-board
member Ben Bernanke famously outlined a contingency plan to avoid the repetition
of the Japanese experience (Bernanke (2002)), our model suggests that he was not
referring to some improbable curiosity: the liquidity trap is part of an equilibrium
story with rational expectations. Moreover, our dilemma shows that, whenever a
Central Bank efficiently accomplishes its mission dedicated to consumer-price sta-
bility (i.e., avoids scenario (iia)), then it faces only two alternative scenarios: either
inflation in financial markets driven by some exuberance whose bursting may induce
a general collapse (scenario (iib)); or a liquidity trap (scenario (i)). In scenario (iib),
if the Central Bank sticks to consumer-price stability it will have little reason to raise
interest rates aggressively, and will therefore be unable to fight against financial ex-
uberance, and hence, prevent a crash. Thus, our approach provides a theoretical
ground for a plea in favor of Central Banks standing ready to depart from their price
stability goal in the name of financial stability.
In scenario (i), application of the Taylor benchmark encounters the zero-bound
problem: while the Taylor rule would recommend a negative interest rate, this is
impossible to achieve because rational depositors are not prepared to pay for keeping
deposits.59
Thus, our approach also makes the case for the use of unconventional monetary
policies in order to avoid liquidity traps. The recommended policy, however, is a
striking variant of the zero-interest rate policy (ZIRP). Imagine, indeed, that the
59We did not formally define the Taylor rule in our present framework. There are two reasons for
this: as already said, interest-targeting policies are only partially equivalent to quantity-targeting
ones, and require a specific inquiry: second-period interest rates should depend upon first-period
interest rates as well as commodity prices. A cme corresponding to such a monetary policy would
therefore involve a fixed point involving both the monetary tools and the market clearing equations.
We leave this for further research.
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Central Bank prints vast amounts of banknotes and drops them from helicopters.
Individuals receiving banknotes from heaven could suddenly feel richer and could
spend at least part of this money, especially if they have heard about monetarism
and fear that relying on the printing press will in the end induce inflation. Demand
should pick up and inflation would indeed follow later on. As we have seen, this
reasoning, however, does not necessarily hold here: the quantity theory of money, in
the present model, does not lead to the classical dichotomy for any level of printed
money.60 Thus, economic agents know that the Central Bank’s power to create
money does not automatically result in inflation. If, indeed, investors are convinced
that, in the second period, the Central Bank will not pursue its easy money policy,
the scenario (i) of our narrative tells us that they will horde the unspent helicopter
money. For this additional money to help the economy escape from the liquidity trap,
the Bank must convince the economic agents that it will pursue its zero-interest rate
policy; hence, the Bank should commit to holding interest rates at zero in the second
period as well: we are then back to our scenario (iia).
The issue at hand therefore becomes one of finding channels by which the Central
Bank can commit, implicitly or explicitly, to higher inflation in the future (i.e., to
even lower rates and more liquidity in the second period). Thus, our approach sus-
tains the viewpoint vividly expressed by Krugman (2000) (and later by Orphanides
(2004)) in the context of the Japanese crisis: the Central Bank of Japan “needs a
credible commitment to expand not only the current but also future money supplies,
which therefore raises future expected prices—or, equivalently, a credible commit-
ment to future inflation” Krugman (2000), Theorem 2 shows that, there is no alter-
native to such an “irresponsible” commitment, as otherwise the Central Bank faces
two major failures: either a deflationary liquidity trap or the possibility of a finan-
cial crash. This absence of a fourth scenario (in which the Central Bank could avoid
disaster and still commit to being “responsible” ’ with respect to consumer prices) is
what we have called the “dilemma of unconventional monetary policy”. How can the
Central Bank proceed with such a commitment? For instance, by monitoring long-
term rates, r0. Central Banks normally only target the short end of the yield curve,
leaving the determination of longer-term interest rates to market mechanisms. In
a situation of near-deflation, however, the Central Bank can commit to keep policy
rates low for an extended period and enter into refinancing operations with extended
maturity, thereby imposing a ceiling on interest rates at the corresponding time hori-
zon. Here, there is room for a monitoring of long-term rates: if r0 decreases (say, by
the increase ofM0), then the no-arbitrage relationship between first-period long-term
rates and second-period short-term rates implies that rs must decrease for each s.61
C) One difficulty in considering default together with money in our general frame-
work is that many standard properties of default-free general equilibrium theory with
money fail. Prominent among them is the Quantity Theory of Money in period 1
(see Proposition 4.1 supra). This requires finding new arguments in several respects.
Second, the classical non-arbitrage argument on the yield curve no longer holds, so
that it is not true, in general, that:
60Only above a certain threshold of injected money do we recover the dichotomy between the real
and the nominal spheres, due to the boundedness of physical trades.
61Going further into the exploration of such an alternative policy would go beyond the scope of
this paper, and is left for further research.
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(1 + r0) ≥ (1 + r0) min
s
(1 + rs). (46)
This makes the proof of existence more complicated, as the latter relies heavily
on such a non-arbitrage relationship (see, e.g., Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003b)).
Similarly, the fact that households may default on the loans of the Central Bank
induces the failure of the following, otherwise standard, equality:






for every path (0, s). Indeed, all we know is that, at equilibrium, no agent will end






s is used to pay back
interest rates. In the absence of default, (47) follows. But, if default is permitted as
in this paper, then:






D) In this paper, we use two different institutional arrangements for the col-
lateralization process: in the first, the collateral vector for long-term loans, κh
0
, is
borrower-specific and endogenous; in the second, the collateral vector for securities,
κj, is exogenous. The reason why we use the endogenous arrangement for long-run
loans relates to the interaction of money with default. Suppose, indeed, we were to
allow for long-term loans collateralized by a fixed vector, κ0 (for each unit of credit
extension). The interest rate would then be given by:
















being bounded by the quantity of available collateral,M0 → +∞ would imply r0 < 0
at equilibrium. The endogenous formulation of collateral constraints avoids this
pathology.
On the other hand, we impose an exogenous collateral level for financial assets
for the sake of simplicity. Allowing for endogenous collateral levels in the financial
market would make the existence proof more complicated, for we must find an upper-
bound for asset short-selling.
E) In asserting condition HDD, we have assumed that the asset functions are
bounded in terms of asset prices.
Actually, this condition can be removed if there is no circularity in the definition
of financial assets. To deal with the more general case, suppose that there exists
a tower of assets, such that each asset is polynomially bounded in terms of prices,
interest rates and prices of preceding assets. Thus, up to a relabelling, we suppose
that Aksj = O(||p, r, pik′<k||bk), for 1 < k ≤ K. This assumption involves no loss of
generality if there is a tower of assets and asset functions are semi-algebraic. Given
the fact that the finance industry invents new financial assets one after the other
(first, derivatives on commodity prices, then derivatives of derivatives, and so on),
the existence of a tower of assets is always assured in practice. If we order the existing
assets by their date of invention, then the asset whose return is a function of other
assets depends only on the prices of assets previously invented. So our definition
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essentially excludes unbounded yields on assets defined circularly (e.g., the yield of
asset 1 depends on the price of asset 2, and yield of asset 2 depends on the price of
asset 1).
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A Appendix
This Appendix provides the proof of the existence theorem and of the properties of
the yield curve.
A.1 The existence theorem
We prepare the proof with two lemmas.
Denote by 1i ∈ RS∗×L+ the vector whose i-th component is equal to 1, and all
others are zero, for i ∈ S∗ × L, and 1 the vector RS∗×L+ all components of which are
equal to 1.





s` + 1, that is, the maximum amount of each commodity
that exists in our economy. Define uh∗ := uh(K∗1), that is the maximum utility that
h can get, since the quantity of each commodity available in the economy in each
state is less than K∗.
Let  be the cube with sides of length K∗ in RS
∗×L
+ , that is the set x ≤ K∗1.
Lemma A.1 There is H∗ such that uh(H∗1i) > uh∗ for every component i of S∗×L
and any h.
Proof. Let Hh > 0 be chosen large enough so that, for Hh in any component:
uh(0, ..., 0, Hh, 0, ..., 0) > uh∗
The following argument (adapted from footnote 19 in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003a))
proves that such an Hh exists, up to a redefinition of the utility function, outside
the domain of the economy. Define u˜h : RS∗×L+ → R by u˜h(y) := inf{Lx(y), x ∈ },
where Lx is an affine function representing the supporting hyperplane to the graph of
uh at the point (x, uh(x)). u˜h coincides with uh on  (by concavity of uh), and there
exists some Hh such that u˜h(0, ..., 0, Hh, 0, ..., 0) > uh∗ for Hh in any component.
Then H∗ := maxhHh verifies the lemma. 
Lemma A.2 There exists ξh > 0, such that if x ∈ RS∗×L+ , x ∈  and 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1
then uh(x+ ∆1i)− uh(x) ≥ ξh∆ for every component i.
Proof. Define ξh = min
i,x
{uh(x+ 1i)− uh(x)|x ∈ RS∗×L+ , x ∈ , i ∈ S∗×L}. Since uh
is strictly increasing, uh(x + 1i) − uh(x) is positive. As the minimum is taken over
a compact set, ξh is positive. Then uh(x + ∆1i) ≥ (1 −∆)uh(x) + ∆uh(x + 1i) by
concavity of uh. By construction of ξh, we therefore have the claimed lemma. 
Proof of Existence Theorem 1.
The main difficulty lies in the fact that financial asset prices may be zero.62 As in
Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), we introduce for each pi > 0, an auxiliary economy,
Epi, which differs from E only in that asset promises are given by:
Ak,pis (η0, η1) := A
k
s(η0, η1) + pi.
62Given our rational expectations set-up, the price of any asset yielding a null return, will nec-
essarily be null at equilibrium. For instance, a call to purchase an ounce of gold at e800 will be
priced 0 if, at equilibrium, the price of gold is always strictly less than e800.
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We add a dummy player to this auxiliary economy. Within the augmented auxiliary
economy, Epi,ε, we prove the existence of an active monetary equilibrium (part 1).
We then remove the dummy player, by taking the limit as ε → 0+ and prove the
existence of a monetary equilibrium in Epi with asset prices that are bounded away
from 0 (part 2). We finally take the limit pi → 0+ (part 3).
Part 1. Existence in Epi,ε with a dummy player.
For any ε > 0, we define a truncated generalized game Γpi,ε on a continuum
player-set with types H. Each time h corresponds to, say, the unit interval [0, 1] of
identical players, equipped with the restriction of the Lebesgue measure. Following
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003a, 2006a,b), we add a dummy player who puts up for
sale ε units for sale of each instrument (commodities, assets, loans) except for assets,
which is discussed below. Furthermore, she puts up ε units of money for purchase
on every market. This external player fully delivers on her promises. Recall that, by
Assumption HDD, the functions Akj are polynomially dominated Akj = O(||p, r||b).
The dummy player puts up for sale εb+1 of each asset k63.
The other players act strategically, and prices form so as to clear every market
(taking the dummy player into account). A type-symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE)
of Γpi,ε will be called an ε-Monetary Equilibrium (ε-cme).64 The payoff to any player
h is her final utility uh(xh).
We first construct truncated strategy sets in the auxiliary game Γpi,ε. For any
ε > 0, we define Σhε := {σh : 0 ≤ σh ≤ 1/ε}, the ambient strategy space of type h
where asset purchases and sales are bounded by 1/ε. This completes the construction
of the generalized market game Γpi,ε. Since players can bid and supply on each side
of each market, it can be interpreted as a double auction where only market orders
(and not limit-price orders) are allowed.





Given an action profile σ = (σh) ∈ ∏h Σhε , define the macrovariables ηε(σ) :=







































Finally, the subset of Σhε that is feasible for player h, given σ, is Σhε ∩ Σhηε(σ).
Let ψh(σ) = arg maxuh(σh), where the maximum is taken over σh in the feasible




63In case of a tower of assets, the quantity bought and sold depends on the asset. Recall that we
imposed that Akj = O(||p, r, pik′<k||bk). The dummy player puts for sale εβk of asset k, where the
βk are defined recursively by β1 = 1 + b1, βk = 1 + bkmax
k′<k
βk′ .
64Throughout the proof, we confine ourselves to type-symmetric action profiles. By a slight abuse




action of a single, negligible, individual τ ∈ [0, 1]. The interpretation should be clear from the
context.
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Thanks to the introduction of the dummy player, all the standard convexity and
continuity assumptions are satisfied. Hence, best-reply correspondences ψh have a
closed graph and convex values. Thus, the standard Kakutani-fixed-point argument
ensures that there exists a type-symmetric pure NE in the truncated generalized
game Γpi,ε. Choose a fixed point σ(ε) and denote the macrovariables ηε(σ(ε)) by
ηε = (rε, piε, pε). This is an ε-cme.
Part 2. Dropping the dummy player.
In this part, we show that a limit of ε-cme, as ε → 0+, is a bona fide cme of
Epi. From now on, we set ε, pi < 1. Let ε → 0, up to a subsequence we can suppose
that each component (and each ratio of these components) of σ(ε) and ηε converges
(possibly to zero or infinity).
Step 1 σh(ε) maximizes uh in Σhηε (and not just Σhε ∩Σhηε, which is true by construc-
tion).
To prove the claimed result, we prove that all σh in Σhηε are bounded, independently
of ε and pi.
By assumption, collateral requirements for each asset are non zero. Choose a





Thus, to sell more than M units of asset Aks would require more collateral than is
available in the entire economy. So αhk ≤M. By physical constraints (22), we have
qh0` ≤ eh0` ∀` ∈ L, so that qh0 is also bounded. By (13), µ˜h0 and µ˜h0 are also bounded.
By construction of the interest rate rε0, we have
µh0
1+rε0























≤ 2M . Consequently, q˜h0 and α˜hk are bounded.




0`, which is bounded (since
each q˜g0` is so). The same applies to pi
εkαk. Thus the rhs of (16) is bounded. Recalling
that either µh0 or µ˜h0 is null, it follows that µh0 is bounded, and thus r0 as well (see the
next step for a detailed proof). This ensures that in every case, ∆(16) is bounded.











is already so. Thus r0 is bounded (see the next step for a detailed
proof). This ensures that in every case, ∆(17) is bounded.




0`. The rhs is
bounded (since each qg0` is so). Then κ
h
0`
is bounded by (15) and so is xh0 by (23).
In state s, the proof follows the same line of reasoning. First, observe that qhs is
bounded by (24) (recall that ghs is linear), and that µ˜hs is bounded by (18). Therefore,
by construction of rεs,
µhs
1+rεs
is bounded. It follows from (19) that q˜hs is bounded. By
construction of prices pεs, pε`s qs`, hence (by (20) Ak,pis αhk is bounded as well.



































≤ 1, and we already proved that Ak,pis αhk is bounded, con-
sequently, the second term of the previous equality is bounded. It remains to
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show that εb+1Ak,pis is bounded. We have precisely adapted the behavior of the






HDD, Akj (ηε) = O(||pε, rε||b). By construction of prices and interest-rates, we have
pε, rε = O(1/ε). Thus Ak,pis = O(1/εb+1). The conclusion follows65.
We proved that σh is bounded, independently of ε and pi (we put bounds on
qh by commodity scarcity, on αhk by collateral requirements, and then on the other
variables by bounding, at each step, the quantity of money available). As the extra
bounds of 1/ε are irrelevant, for sufficiently small ε, it follows that σh(ε) maximizes
uh in Σhηε .
Step 2 Interest rates, rεn, are non-negative and bounded, for every n.











, rεn is bounded. Furthermore,
rεn ≥ 0, since, if the contrary, player h could improve her profile σh by borrowing
more money, spending a little on commodity and inventorying the money to pay
back the extra-loan.
Step 3 The ratio of commodity prices does not increase indefinitely: the ratios pε`s /pε`
′
s
are bounded for every s ∈ S∗ and every `, `′ ∈ L, as are the ratios pε`0 /pε`′s for every
s ∈ S and every `, `′ ∈ L.
Suppose pε`s /pε`
′
s → ∞ for some ε, `, s. Take h with ehs` > 0. Let her set apart
∆ehs` of her endowment and scale down her actions by 1 −∆. Her utility decreases
by at most ∆(uh∗ − uh(0)) and she still has at least ∆ehs`. Let h borrow more money
on Ms, increasing µhs by ∆pε`s ehs` (possible if ε is sufficiently small, because the extra
boundaries 1/ε are not binding by step 1.), spending the money to purchase and
consume `′ (in quantity ∆pε`s ehs`/(pε`
′
s (1 + r
ε
s)), and selling ∆ehs` to pay back the loan.
Choosing ∆ small enough (depending on ε) so that ∆pε`s ehs`/(pε`
′
s (1 + r
ε
s)) < 1, we







pε`′s (1 + r
ε
s)
− [uh∗ − uh(0)]
)
Under the assumption that pε`s /pε`
′
s →∞, the utility increase is positive because
rεs is bounded. The proof is the same for pε`0 /pε`
′
s , except that h first sells a little of
good ` in period 0 and inventories the money in period s to buy `′.
Step 4 piεk/pε`s remains bounded for all assets k, all commodities ` and every state s.
Suppose some piεk/pε`′s → ∞. Given asset k, take some household h such that,
for each ` with κk` > 0, eh` > 0. Such a household, h, exists by assumption C. Let h
scale down her actions by 1−∆. Her utility decreases by at most ∆(uh∗ −uh(0)) and
she has still at least ∆ehs` for each commodity that makes the collateral of asset k,
she thus can sell at least αhk = ∆min
`
{ehs`/κk` |κk` > 0} more of asset k and get piεkαk
of money. If s = 0, she can increase her borrowing µh0 by piεkαk, spend the money
to obtain more `′ in quantity piεkαk/(pε`
′
0 (1 + r
ε
0)) and sell the asset to pay back her
65The proof is the same in the case of a tower of assets, given the behavior of the dummy player
we have postulated.
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loan. As she holds the collateral, there is no problem for delivery on this asset. The





pε`′s (1 + r
ε
0)
− [uh∗ − uh(0)]
)
Under the assumption piεk/pε`′s → ∞, the utility increase becomes positive because
rε0 is bounded. The proof is simpler if s ∈ S, because h can sell the extra amount of
asset k in period 0, inventory the money in period 1, and then buy more of `′.
Step 5 Prices are bounded away from 0: there exists p > 0 such that pε`s > p for
every commodity ` and every state s ∈ S∗.




0 > 0. Take h such that mh0 > 0.
Let H∗ as in lemma (A.1). Now, we claim that pε`s ≥ m
h
0
H∗ . Otherwise, agent h
could spend her money in order to buy H∗ units of commodity `, thus obtaining
a final utility u˜h(0, ..., 0, H∗, 0, ...0) higher than uh(K∗, ..., K∗). This contradicts the
assumption that K∗ is the maximum utility agent h can get.




0 = 0 but M0 > 0. Suppose that a
price of a commodity is not bounded away. Up to a subsequence, it tends to 0. In
respect to step 3, all prices tends to 0. Because of the collateral constraints (15) and










Since M0 > 0, at least one of the κh0` must tend to ∞, because all prices tend to 0,
as ε tends to 0. But this contradicts the hypothesis that there is a finite amount of
goods in the economy.
So prices are bounded from below in period 0. By step 3, it is also the case in all
state s ∈ S.
Denote rn = lim rεn for n ∈ N (the limit exists up to a subsequence by step 1.).
Step 6 Let s ∈ S. Then rs ≤ mˆs/Ms and r0 ≤ mˆ/M0.



























t ) + ε
∑
`
(1− pε`0 ) + ε
∑
`
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b+1 + [M0 + ε−Ks]
So the interest payment is covered by outside money, money created by the
dummy player on goods and assets markets, money created by the dummy players
on delivery, and money created by default. Note that Ak,pit εb+1 is bounded, because
Ak,pis = O(1/ε
b+1) thanks to the HDD hypothesis. Thus, taking limits, we obtain:





t ) + [M0 −Ks]
Thus rsMs ≤ mˆs and r0M0 ≤ mˆs.
Step 7 Let s ∈ S, then pε`s is bounded for a commodity ` (and hence for all commodi-
ties by step 3).
Suppose that, up to a subsequence, pε`s →∞ (for one, thus all, `). By construction











. Because q˜hs` are bounded, every qhs` must tend to 0. Therefore
the final limit allocation of good x is in Xs (no trade is involved in state s). Let ||.||
be a norm on the space of commodity prices and pˆ` = lim
ε→0
pε`/||pε||.
For each agent h ∈ H, define a utility of trade τ in state s by vh(τ) = uh(xh +
τ ∗(τ, rs)) where τ ∗(τ, rs) ∈ RS∗×L is given by τ ∗t` = 0 if t ∈ S∗\{s}, τ ∗s` = τ` if τ` < 0,
τ ∗s` = τ`/(1 + rs) if τ` ≥ 0. This defines a pure exchange L-goods economy in state
s with utilities vh, endowments xhs and prices pˆ. We want to prove that no-trade
constitutes a Walrasian equilibrium of this economy.
Suppose that it is not a Walras equilibrium. Then, for a player h, there would




+/(1 + rs) instead of q˜h` by taking extra short loan and selling qhs` + [τh` ]−
instead of qhs`. Up to an infinitesimal adjustment when ε→ 0, h could reimburse her
extra loan with her commodities sales, and end up with a greater utility —which
contradicts the assumption that we were at an ε-cme. Hence no-trade constitutes a
Walrasian equilibrium of the pure exchange economy.
By definition, this proves that the spot allocation x is rs-Pareto-optimal in state
s. Thus, gains-to-trade are upper-bounded: γs(x) ≤ rs. But, in respect to step 6
rs ≤ mˆs/Ms, which contradicts the gains-to-trade hypothesis mˆs/Ms < γs(x). Hence
prices remain bounded.
By definition, this proves that the spot allocation x is r0-Pareto-optimal. Thus,
gains-to-trade are upper-bounded: γ(x) ≤ r0. But, in respect to step 6 r0 ≤ mˆs/M0,
which contradicts the gains-to-trade hypothesis mˆs/M0 < γ(x). Hence prices remain
bounded in state s.
Step 8 All prices are bounded.
From step 7, we have that prices of commodities are bounded in every state s ∈ S.
But in respect to step 3, this is also the case for 0. By step 4, asset prices are
bounded. So we have a familiar ME-equilibrium of Epi
Part 3. We then take the limit pi → 0+ to obtain a cme of our economy. This
is possible because we have bounded selling and buying prices independently of pi,
thanks to the liquidity constraints. 
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A.2 Proofs of properties of CME
Proof of proposition 4.1.





























The conclusion follows by (28), (29) and (30).
When r0 > 0, we prove that the liquidity constraint (14) is binding, so ∆(14)h = 0













> 0, individual h can reduce µh0 by an amount of (1 + r0). In both cases,
this increases ∆(16) by r0, positive by assumption, and so the right-hand side of
(19). This leads to a contradiction since individual h is thus able to increase her
final allocation in consumption commodities in state s. So if ∆(14) > 0, one must
have ∆(13) = 0 and µh0 = 0, so that the individual h only borrows long-term money
to spend on commodities and asset. But the collateral constraint (15) forces her
to spend all the money on commodities. Hence ∆(14) = 0, which contradicts the
hypothesis. We then have that ∆(14) = 0 in all cases.
(ii) The second inequality obtains similarly by summing (19) over h. The equality
follows, since, as we now show, (19) must be binding when rs > 0.
Suppose, first, that ∆(20) = 0. We claim that it is always possible to choose
the players’ action so that ∆(19) = 0. Consider indeed a player h with ∆(19) > 0.






















































































k − qhs`) ≥ ∆(19), so γ ≤ 1.














Being a convex combination of the previous (feasible) action and the feasible
action that sells entirely the stored collateral in `, the selling action satisfies the
physical constraints.
With these actions, we now have ∆(20) = 0 and ∆(19) = 0. The quantity
available for agent h is unchanged, so that final utility levels are unchanged. As a
consequence, from now on, we shall always assume that ∆(20) = 0⇒ ∆(19) = 0.
Suppose then that ∆(19) > 0. Set  = min(∆(20),∆(19)), by assumption  > 0.








or reduce her short loan µhs on s by . She spends rs/(1 + rs) (which
is positive since rs > 0) more on final commodities. Thus ∆(19) decreases by  and
thus, by construction of , (19) and (20) are still satisfied. Right-hand side of (21)
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is decreased by , but the left-hand side also decreases, because h has reduced her
short loan or increased her deposits by this amount. So h has increased her utility
in state s, a contradiction.
This proves that (19) is binding. One then sums (19) up to (13) over h and uses
(28), (30) to obtain the desired conclusion.
For the third equation, one just needs to notice that ∆(21) = 0. In fact, if h has
some money left at the end of s, she could have borrowed more, consumed more, and
still been able to re-pay her loan. One then sums (21) over h and uses (28), (29) and
∆(19) = 0 to obtain the desired conclusion. Alternatively, one can use (40) (which
also relies on ∆(21) = 0) to derive the third equation from the second. 
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